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Lizichev, Others on Glasnost Relating to Army Problems

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[“Round-table” material prepared by *KOMMUNIST* editorial associates V. Arkhipenko and O. Khlebnyuk and *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* editorial associates A. Golda and Yu. Tretyakov: “The Army of Revolution, the Army of the People;” first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In our country there is virtually no one who has not been directly affected by problems of life in the Soviet Armed Forces. The army safeguards the peaceful labor of the people and exercises its influence on the moral climate in society in many ways since it is a school of courage and patriotism and of ideological tempering for the rising generation. It is not only people's personal destinies but also success in our common cause, namely, the cause of perestroika, that largely depend on what sort of school this will be. Accordingly, on the jubilee of the Soviet Army and Navy the organizers of and participants in the meeting decided to take advantage of the occasion to discuss the urgent problems in the history and present-day development of our Armed Forces.

Army Gen A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, made the introductory remarks to those taking part in the round-table discussion.

We have gathered here on the eve of a great national holiday—the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. This jubilee is a shining page in our country's history. The entire destiny of the Soviet Armed Forces has been linked to the destiny of the socialist state and to the struggle by the Soviet people for freedom and independence and to preserve and consolidate the gains of the October. The glorious deeds of the country's courageous defenders are written with letters of gold in the heroic chronicle of the motherland.

As is known, immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, world imperialism in alliance with the forces of internal counterrevolution unleashed armed intervention and civil war against the young Soviet republic.

Who could reliably defend the gains of the proletarian revolution? It could be done only by the armed people of labor themselves. Creating a workers' and peasants' army capable of smashing the combined forces of internal and external counterrevolution became a matter of life and death. V.I. Lenin taught that any revolution must be able to defend itself.

The party and the people set about creating the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army—an army of the new, socialist type. This work was done in an unbelievably complex situation. There was no economic base to provide an

army with military equipment, weapons, ammunition, uniforms and food supplies. No command personnel had been trained and there was no experience in building a new army. The enormous weariness of the masses, the result of the imperialist war, also had its effect. It was necessary to move through all this and survive and win through.

Now, as we survey the past, we are astonished at how wisely the party resolved the question of forming and strengthening the Red Army, and at how persistently military policy was pursued. We remember, for example, the feral onslaughts of the opportunists of various ilk in the West who raised the cry about “red militarism” and the “red danger,” asserting that the soviets were creating their own armed forces for predatory purposes. And it was hardly easy for Lenin to achieve unity within the central committee itself when he defended the principles of building the new army! There was a multitude of views and opinions whose advocates did not always clearly see the disposition of class forces in the country and failed to understand the fate of the state's military organization for the dictatorship of the proletariat. And Lenin had to bear the colossal strain of the struggle, for example, against even those members of the central committee who disputed the need for political leadership of the army by the party. It was precisely at his initiative that in December 1918 the central committee issued the decree “On the Policy of the War Department,” which established that the highest principle in military development is the leading role of the party.

This principle was and is fundamental in development of the Armed Forces. History testifies that it serves as one of the main sources of their strength and invincibility.

Yes, those were difficult times, and the party and the country's workers made incredible efforts, but as a result we did create an army. It was a mass army, a regular army whose foundation was made up of the most aware workers and peasants and commanders and illustrious military generals drawn from among the people. And along with the well-known generals we also name those who were repressed and, as it were, erased from history.

We created an army permeated with the spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Under the banners of the Red regiments, Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians and Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and many other nationalities within the country fought for the power of the soviets. We created an army that was cemented by centralism in management and by one-man command, and by conscious military discipline. An army that knew what it was defending and what it was fighting for.

Relying on support from the working masses, the Red Army routed the well-armed forces of the foreign interventionists and White Guards. Socialism had won its first fierce battle against imperialism.

The Red Army repeatedly repulsed the militarists infringing on our borders. It won through in the severe trial of the war against fascist Germany. The Soviet Armed Forces smashed the aggressor's war machine and the soldiers displayed unrivaled gallantry and courage in the fighting with the enemy.

Victory did not come easy. What Soviet people had to endure in that war, particularly in the first months! But the long-awaited day did come when the country, and the entire world that had been saved breathed freely. Overcoming all misfortune, pain and suffering, our people forged the victory. The people advanced a whole cohort of marshals, generals and officers who commanded the fronts and armies, the corps, divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. The Soviet soldier bore the brunt of the war, one flesh with the people, the great worker, courageous and filled with love for his homeland.

The experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War is truly beyond value. The party teaches us to study it deeply and purposefully and to apply it actively to practical military affairs. And in this connection I would like to state the following.

Calls to eliminate the so-called "blank" spots in our history, particularly our military history, have been appearing recently in the press organs. The authors of these calls are often people who are not distinguished by any deep knowledge of the subject. As in other sciences, in fact there are quite a few "blank" spots in history. For the most diverse reasons. At this level dogmatism and an approach redolent of jumping on the bandwagon in elucidating certain events inevitably have their effect. But can this be a correct position when, while declaiming for the truth, these comrades have focused their attention only on negative phenomena? They forget here about what has been achieved previously, including what was glorious and heroic, that the people hold dear.

It is common knowledge that the situation was difficult and ambiguous during the first months of the war on the various sectors of the front and how the combat actions went. There were bitter failures. But given all this, in that same period we have worthy memories of the victories won by our arms, and it is important to popularize them and not remain shamefully silent, which is what individual authors are doing. Documents and archival data on the initial period of the war speak not only of our troops' withdrawal but also of skillful and heroic actions by regiments, divisions and armies, and of deeds in which the people take pride today.

Work is now starting on a 10-volume work entitled "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People." Military leaders, historians, and representatives of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans are involved in it. We think that the new study will make it possible to depict the events of the Great Patriotic War truthfully and provide

a fitting assessment of the heroic efforts of the people and the army in the struggle against fascism, and reveal previously unknown facts and avoid subjectivist preferences and the craze of jumping on the bandwagon.

It seems that at our meeting also the discussion is about how to be more active in "including" all our military historic legacy—both the models of courage and heroism that showed Soviet soldiers to the world in the last war, and objective analysis of the reasons for the bitter failures—in the cause of the patriotic indoctrination of our youth. For us, history is not only a tribute to yesterday but also a powerful means of shaping the high moral spirit of the Soviet people.

The Vitality of Revolutionary Traditions Flt Adm G. Yegorov, Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee:

The experience and lessons of the history of the Soviet Armed Forces today serve to strengthen our state's defense capability. It is essential to master in-depth the Leninist ideas on the high calling of the Red Army as an army of the new type. In indoctrination work we underestimate the experience of veterans, those who participated in its creation and defended the gains of socialism during the Great Patriotic War. I joined the Navy in answer to a call from the Komsomol. At that time the navy was only beginning to be restored. Our legacy was a difficult one, one might say only the leavings. But thanks to the efforts of the party and the Soviet people, before the Great Patriotic War a navy was created. At the same time experience was being gained and people's knowledge improved. I remember well how we valued competence and a sense of discipline. Those who did not know their duties were considered the most dangerous people on a ship. Because at sea there is no one to help. And now we must instill these qualities and a sense of responsibility in our youth.

A. Krushelnitskiy, senior associate at the USSR Armed Forces Central Museum, Candidate of Historical Sciences:

I think that today we must study more attentively the experience gained over seven decades in the struggle to strengthen discipline in our army. In the early Twenties, for example, the Red Army encountered problems of lax discipline. The leadership at that time in the Revolutionary Military Council failed to take steps to correct the situation that had taken shape. Communists in the army sounded the alarm. One of them the well-known military leader during the civil war, Yu.V. Sablin, sent an article entitled "The Attention of the Party" to the newspaper IZVESTIYA VTsIK [All-Russian Executive Committee]. He showed the need to focus the attention of broad party circles on the life of the Red Army and to strengthen party representation in it and take a number of urgent steps. The article, however, was not published. In January 1923 the deputy chairman of the Republic

Revolutionary Military Council E.M. Sklyanskiy concluded that "...there is no need to make a fuss in public. It will be used against us in the West. We must take practical steps and punish each individual case..."

The IZVESTIYA editorial office officially stated that "...the phenomena cited by comrade Sablin are not as numerous as might be thought from the article." And this was asserted at a time when everyday reports testifying to mass disciplinary violations among the troops were arriving on Sklyanskiy's desk and on the desk of the then chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council L.D. Trotskiy. There is much food for thought, for example, in local reports coming in: "... There have recently been greater numbers of complaints from young men in the Red Army to the effect that the cooks are giving senior servicemen better food than them..."

The position taken at that time by the Republic Revolutionary Military Council was very similar to the situation that took shape in 1919, when in a letter to S.I. Gusev, V.I. Lenin emphasized that "...when trying to understand Sklyanskiy's letter (on the state of affairs on 15 September) and the summary of the reports, I am convinced that your Republic Revolutionary Military Council is operating poorly.

"Trying to calm things down all the time is a poor tactic. We end up with a 'game of calm.'

"And in fact we have stagnation, almost disintegration."

In the late Twenties and early Thirties steps were taken to correct the situation. Discipline was then considered to be first and foremost the result of indoctrination work. In the process of this work, experienced command personnel and political workers were shaped. However, the deaths of a significant proportion of them in the late Thirties seriously worsened the situation. In order No 120 of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense dated 16 May 1940, S.K. Timoshenko stated directly that "experience gained in the war in the Karelian-Finnish theater has revealed major defects in combat training and indoctrination in the army. Military discipline was not as high as it should have been..."

It was necessary to start the restructuring of combat training in 1940 by strengthening military discipline. In general, they went down the road of strict bureaucratic rule at that time. It was not possible to make radical changes, and what had been lost had to be made up in wartime. **Question:** Has access to archival documents been made easier?

A. Krushelnitskiy:

The procedure for access to military historical documents of the Soviet era remains very complicated. The instructions used as the basis for gaining access are long since outdated.

Lt Col P. Nersesyan, teacher at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Candidate of Historical Sciences:

Right from the very start the Red Army had been created as a multinational army. Among its soldiers and commanders were the representatives of more than 50 nationalities. This raised a number of complex problems for the Communist Party. The most important of them was the problem of military personnel. Party and Soviet workers from many parts of the country had been directed into the army. A considerable number of personnel were trained in the general VUZ's of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. At the same time, taking into account the language factor and distinctive national features, more than 30 national military training establishments were set up. National military formations were created. They were built on the same principles as the army in general but they made it easier for Red Army personnel from the national regions to become accustomed to service life.

In the search for optimal forms for the organization of political indoctrination and cultural-and-enlightenment work a system of special organs was formed, made up of the political officers in the Red Army; these were the national sections. Great attention was paid to the organization of service and the everyday life of the soldiers, giving due consideration their their special national features. In this regard, the experience of the Revolutionary Military Council on the Turkestan Front, led by M.V. Frunze, is worthy of note. During the period of the first draft of workers from among the indigenous nationalities into the Red Army in 1920, the front commander ordered that a set of measures be devised and implemented to organize the draft. Here, attention was paid to the need to take into account the customs of Muslims. The chief of supplies for the front, for example, was given the task of organizing the preparation of food for the Muslims according to their taste and habits by replacing millet with rice and organizing the baking of flat cakes instead of bread. A special case, it would seem. But when these kinds of details affected the representatives of formerly oppressed nationalities they acquired political meaning. And it was precisely this that explained the demand from the Revolutionary Military Council for the Turkestan Front obliging all commanders and political workers to study one of the local languages.

V. Polikarpov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Chief Scientific Associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute:

When studying historical experience we often restrict ourselves to military-technical matters, letting slip the question of the moral and political foundations for indoctrination of rising generations. The nonobjective elucidation of history is reflected adversely in the moral attributes of youth, particularly soldiers in the Armed Forces. We have started actively to rehabilitate the good names of the heroes of the civil war, first and foremost those of them who were doomed to oblivion as a result of repression. This work started way back in the Sixties, but even then it caused great difficulties and resistance. And it has turned out that many of the heroes of the civil war remain little known.

Rejoinder:

We know more about Napoleon's marshals than we do about the heroes of the civil war. Lt V. Solodkov, Komsomol committee secretary aboard the escort ship LADNYY (Black Sea Fleet):

Many young sailors have a poor knowledge of the history of the country and the Armed Forces. Ideas about the civil war are only general, and sometimes they are unable to say anything at all about it.

V. Polikarpov:

Up to now, however, it happens that pieces published about the heroes of the civil war have been called "unhealthy sensationalism." Of course it is important that we have looked to the years of the Great Patriotic War for models of famed generals of the past. This has been of great indoctrination importance. But the revolution gave birth to new heroes in whose images Soviet socialist patriotism was embodied. The names of many of them were subsequently stricken from history. The figure of even a general as outstanding as general of the Leninist school M.V. Frunze was for a long time overshadowed. And it was precisely these people who are our pride, the bearers of our socialist traditions. And I think that Soviet soldiers would bear an Order of Frunze with no less inspiration than an order of Aleksandr Nevskiy or of other illustrious Russian generals.

The intricate question of party military policy during the civil war also remains unstudied. Until now many questions have been treated in the spirit of the "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)." As before we do not say directly that Stalin stood behind the "military opposition" that acted against Lenin's military policy at the 8th Congress. He initiated his practical opposition to recruiting military experts to build up a regular Red Army as far back as 1918 in Tsaritsyn. But his position was not supported in the central committee. In the Thirties, under the conditions of the personality cult, he succeeded in taking a unique "revenge." Cadres of the old military experts were destroyed, and then the political workers who on instructions from the central committee and Lenin had monitored Stalin in 1918-1919.

During the course of the repressions a significant proportion of the country's intellectual potential was destroyed. This exerted an adverse effect on the combat capability of the Armed Forces, particularly during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. And today it is essential honestly to draw the lessons of these tragic events on the basis of Lenin's legacy.

G. Yegorov:

Perhaps it is now high time to put to rest every kind of extreme discussions and write an objective book about Stalin. For this will be of very great importance for the political-moral indoctrination of youth and the army.

V. Polikarpov:

A proposal to end critical discussions was made in 1964-1965. And for 20 years everything has been closed off.

G. Yegorov:

And has the question now been opened up?

V. Polikarpov:

Yes, the question has been opened up, but if now again instructions to stop in-depth, Bolshevik-style truthful and objective research prevail, then this sore will again suppurate inside.

S. Epifantsev, Komsomol Central Committee secretary:

We are guided by the principle that perestroika must be carried out with due consideration of the experience of history. The foundations of relationships between the army and the public organizations were laid long ago when the Red Army was created. In 1918 a decision was adopted on universal military training for the workers, and in 1923 there was the Decree on the Work of the Komsomol in the Red Army and Navy. We now have quite a few publications dealing with just one period in our history, namely the Thirties and the Forties. But our roots lie much deeper, back to October 1917. The historical memory either helps us in perestroika or leads us into a morass of disagreements and disputes.

V. Polikarpov:

Truth is not "encapsulated" in the head but is assimilated by each person individually by comparing different viewpoints and thinking about them. It is a very complex and refined process. We are obliged to direct it into the proper channel.

Col Gen V. Lobov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces:

Why have we suddenly started to raise the issue of history? What, have we already forgotten our history? One sometimes thinks that if we ourselves have not been indoctrinated in this history, how can the soldier be indoctrinated? And now, I would like to raise something new. History is made up of specific people and specific deeds. We must study our history more deeply.

Not long ago the youth television program "The 12th Floor" raised an issue. A journalist stopped young people on the street and was interested to know whether their grandfathers fought in the Great Patriotic War. All of them responded in the affirmative, but none of them could say where their grandfathers had fought, in which units, on which fronts, how they fought or what specifically they accomplished. In my opinion this is astonishing ignorance; in all their 15 or 16 years they had never been interested enough to find out these things. Why? Surely an interest in the heroic past of our own people is instilled in us from our earliest years, in school.

At the same time let us consider what place, for example, the history of our Armed Forces occupies in the school textbooks. A very insignificant one.

The language of the textbooks is extremely sparing, and the textual part is covered in an excess of clichés. And how important the emotional factor is in teaching the history of our motherland! In this connection I would cite to cite from the demands made on the teaching of history in the military schools of the Russian army: "Our history must develop a **sense of patriotism**, but without distorting the truth, and it should not cause any sense of arrogance... There must be pictures in color of people at the height of their powers, with their idiosyncrasies, defects and virtues, **real people, not cutout figures**." I think that this is exactly how the illustrious Soviet marshals Tukhachevskiy, Yegorov and Shaposhnikov and the thousands of generals and officers of the Russian army, loyal to their patriotic duty and switching to the side of Soviet power, studied the history of our motherland.

In my opinion, the system of teaching military history in our VUZ's cannot satisfy us today.

Lt Col V. Chichko, commander of a motorized infantry regiment:

I am worried by the problem of the literature we use to study history. The 18th century according to V. Pikul, the Thirties according to A. Rybakov. In the last 10 to 15 years we have altered fundamentally our assessment of particular historical personalities. This is not the best way to indoctrinate a respectful attitude toward senior people, including ultimately even me, as a regimental commander. What we need is historical truth, one truth for many years, not just for a short period.

A. Anfinogenov, writer, veteran of the Great Patriotic War:

I have just come from Perm where I had been invited by the pathfinders at No 3 School, which for 10 years now has been led by wonderful teacher N.V. Konyukhova. The lads re-traveled the combat path of the 8th Air Army from Stalingrad to Prague. These lads are small citizens but the questions that bother them are big. They ask why we won our victory, which was truly a great victory, on the Volga and against the walls of Stalingrad. Why did this happen? I think that there is no need to fear such questions, just as there is no need to lead by the bridle that part of youth that states: "Well, we do not want to talk about it." We should not indulge this kind of civic infantilism. We should meet these very acute head on in order to eliminate them.

I am now completing a book on fliers, about 1941, and, this means, also 1937. You know the terrible figures: by noon on 22 June about 1,200 Soviet aircraft had been destroyed, more than 800 of them while still on the ground. How could this have happened? The question of responsibility must be raised! It is just as important to be fair with regard to those heroes who have been undeservedly forgotten. I have spoken about this repeatedly and I would like once again to use the example, so that we

remember: the exploit of the legendary submariner A. Marinesko has up to now still not been noted as it deserves.

Maj V. Kozlov, senior instructor in the political department of a formation, psychologist:

We greatly need the truth of history. I make bold to assert that young people in the army are drawn to it, and to the objective articles that have recently been appearing with increasing frequency.

The main thing is that history be truthful. Let everything be put in its proper place. Certainly the thought is also to write a serious book on the history and traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

P. Nersesyan:

It is impossible to decide by a vote what the truth of history is. The truth is the truth, and it must be found. You cannot forbid people to think. The call to collect together a group of historians and try all at once to reveal all the correct answers is a very dogmatic approach that has also led to a situation in which the historical sciences today are greatly in debt to our society.

Perestroika in Society: Perestroika in the Army

Army Gen A. Lizichev:

When thinking about the 70-year history of the Armed Forces we as it were project the past into the present life and training of Soviet soldiers. Take a look at the lineament of the modern army; what is it? Who now stands in the formation of the defenders of the motherland?

In the 1980's the soldiers live one life with the people. It is now possible to hear the most contradictory conversations about the rising generation. It must, however, be said that among the overwhelming proportion of youth here there are loyal communist ideals and socialist values. Service in the army reveals and strengthens the best qualities of the personality of the young man and instills a sense of civic duty and makes him purer, stronger in spirit and inwardly richer.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan are operating in exceptionally complex conditions, often accompanied by risk to life. They are showing loyalty to their oath and international duty and their revolutionary and combat traditions. More than 60 men have been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and tens of thousands have been awarded orders and medals. After they are discharged into the reserve, the soldier-internationalists are showing themselves to be models in peaceful labor and are becoming the sponsors of many glorious deeds and are doing much military-patriotic work.

And what of the strength of will and readiness for self-sacrifice on behalf of the interests of the people that many soldiers and officers displayed during the cleanup

operations following the accident at the Chernobyl AES? A true heroism in everyday military affairs distinguishes the affairs of servicemen carrying out their duty in the Arctic latitudes and in the intense heat of the Karakum, in direct contact with the strike groupings of NATO troops in West Europe and in the Far East, and across the expanses of the oceans.

As they implement in a practical way the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the requirement stemming from the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, the military councils, commanders, political officers and political organizations in the Army and Navy are increasing personnel readiness and shaping in servicemen a readiness and ability to carry out their duty under the most complex conditions of the combat situation. The Soviet Armed Forces are reliably safeguarding the gains of socialism.

Not everything in our army service, however, is faultless. The overall state of society in the years of stagnation has also left its mark on the processes taking place within the Armed Forces.

It is common knowledge how sharp and principled the CPSU Central Committee Politburo's assessment of the negative phenomena has been. The military councils, commanders and political officers have now set a firm course toward perestroika in all spheres of army life. And first and foremost, in enhancing the responsibility of military personnel and strengthening military discipline. Much is being done to eradicate nonregulation relationships. To regard them as sometime born out of the army is deliberately to oversimplify the problem. The young man often encounters violations of the norms of socialism communal living, the ethics of mutual relations, rudeness, and the abasement of human dignity before military service—in the vocational and technical schools, *tekhnikums* and even *VUZ's*. These phenomena have already spread within the milieu of the army. Having set the task of making an end to them, we give publicity [*glasnost*] to every case and make extensive use of the force of public opinion and deal strictly with violations of military discipline. Recently, for example, the commander and chief of the political department in a brigade were relieved of their duties and brought to account in the party because they failed to take decisive steps to establish order in the unit according to the regulations. This has been the approach, and it still is.

One sign of the times and a direct result of perestroika is the expanding democratization in public life in the army, including the life of the party organizations. There is more criticism from below and more weight is being given to the opinion of communists and nonparty servicemen when appointments are made for higher duties, the orientation of training, and other service movements. We have raised the question of having all misdemeanors by communists—commanders and political officers—reviewed in the primary party organizations where they are registered.

The fighting spirit of the army Komsomol has been noticeably improved. We are instilling in members of the Komsomol a sense of responsibility for the affairs of their own subunits and units and their social activeness. The role of the public organizations, trade unions, people's control committees and groups, women's councils, and councils of junior officers is increasingly noticeable in the life of the military collectives.

But inertia in thinking and the stereotypes of past years are still making themselves felt. The habit of taking steps and presenting reports on measures implemented on every single matter has turned out to be very persistent. Overcoming formalism and the "gross" approach in work with people means to see the specific person and know his moods and personal concerns, and to influence his awareness and feelings. Herein, properly speaking, lies the meaning of the new approaches in the organization of party political work. Herein lies the essential nature of activation of the human factor. Only specific influence on people, influence on the matter in hand, and personal example can provide a solid indoctrination effect. We can say with full justification that there would have been no Pavka Korchagin without the sailor Zhukhraya, and without Chapayev no Furmanov and Frunze.

The army is a complex organism. It has its own specific problems and difficulties. It is quite natural that now, in the period of perestroika, society and the mass media are showing greater interest in it. Unfortunately, the view of some authors merely slides across the surface, and in the pursuit of negative facts the main thing is lost from view. And this is that despite the existing shortcomings, the army has been and remains a school for ideological and moral indoctrination, a school of courage and skill. And our youth must be indoctrinated first and foremost in a positive way. Otherwise the 18-year-old may ask the question: why should I care, and is it necessary to serve? This is raising the question pointedly. But today there can be no other way. I happened to be talking about this with writers and journalists. I recall a meeting with Valentin Rasputin. He acknowledged that it is correct to put the question this way. Indoctrination in heroic, revolutionary and combat traditions is the pivot of all work with the present generation of defenders of the motherland.

Lt Col V. Chichko:

Our regiment is stationed on the northern edge of Soviet land. Service there is not easy. But the main task—maintaining the regiment in a state of constant combat readiness—is being fulfilled. As commander, I take full responsibility for saying this. I am, for example, confident that my subordinates have good combat proficiency. According to last year's results, all soldiers who gained a proficiency rating have deserved the title of class specialist.

Our training-and-material base is not bad. Knowledge acquired in classes and at the fighting vehicle gunnery training facility is consolidated during the course of training on the gunnery range. Here, we pay special attention to making fruitful use of each hour of training, and to insure that there is no oversimplification or eyewash. In military affairs, nothing is more pernicious than coloring the truth.

A. Tsyplakov, leader of a military-patriotic club (in Elektrostal city, Moscow Oblast):

But for all that, you did have nonregulation relationships in the regiment, did you not?

Lt Col V. Chichko:

Unfortunately, we were affected by this. But as I have already said, this is a common misfortune. We are dealing with it and will fight decisively against it. The main thing here is good organization in training and service and maintaining strict order in line with the regulations. In and of itself this has already created the prerequisites for eradicating negative phenomena.

I would like to say one more thing. We make note of soldiers for their selfless service, say, and award people orders and medals. We encourage sergeants and enlisted men with short furloughs enabling them to visit home. During the last training year we instituted a challenge prize for "Best Motorized Infantry Company"—a color television set—according to the results of combat and political training for the month. The two servicemen who gain the best results in military labor are given a short furlough. The collective is named after them. This has provided good incentive for the soldiers. People try to win the prize for their own company.

To the point, which is providing incentive for our labor. For various reasons, many of them have in recent times been devalued. Obviously it is necessary to seek out new incentives and use them more skillfully. For example, when soldiers are discharged to the reserve, why not make an entry in enlisted men's and sergeants military record books about how they have carried out their military duties. It is common knowledge that many of them ask their commanding officer to give them references needed for VUZ enrollment or for work in Ministry of Internal Affairs organs, steamship lines and certain other organizations. It happens that over a 2-year period commanders and political officers are replaced and the new ones do not know the former soldiers. Notwithstanding, they often write references "out of good motives." With this kind of approach the attitude of former servicemen to military service is virtually disregarded.

V. Shakhidzhanyan, teacher in the journalism faculty at the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov:

When collecting material for an article on life in today's army I took a poll among enlisted men and officers. I was able to talk with almost 200 people. The first question that I asked everyone was the following: how do you

perceive nonregulation relationships? Some 85 percent of those polled gave a sharply negative response, while the rest were quite unconcerned about this problem and expressed no particular concern. But this is what puts us on our guard: of that 85 percent, 60 percent acknowledged that they themselves had not been, let us say, over-correct in the dealings with young soldiers. They explained it in this way: well, they say, we experienced difficulties in our time, so let others experience them also.

The second question was about attitudes toward officers. Far from all those polled were complimentary about their own commanders. And first and foremost this was because, in their own words, the commanders permitted a gap between word and deed: they demand that the soldiers live by the regulations but they themselves violate them, even if only in small things. Some people complained about the rudeness and disrespectful attitude of senior soldiers toward junior soldiers, the lack of tact, and inattention to people's needs and requests.

I asked: during your service in the army what caused the greatest inward opposition? And often the answer was the following: the desire to "stamp out" as quickly as possible everything civilian in the draftees. I think that this is not quite the correct psychological approach. One officer, for example, banned the soldiers from keeping more than five letters. Why? So as to break all links with "civilian life" as quickly as possible. But is it a bad thing if a soldier maintains a close link with home?

If we talk about the cohesion of the military collectives and the creation of a healthy climate in them, then, judging from the poll, the problem of the low standards in inter-nation [mezhnatsionalnyy] relations is acute. This is explained in part by the poor knowledge of the Russian language possessed by soldiers drafted from the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus. On the other hand, the association of fellow countrymen often occurs in the subunits, and this is the soil on which nonregulation relationships and other violations often grow.

Many of the people I polled acknowledged that during their service they did not read a single book. They also talked about dissatisfaction with the selection of movies. As a rule they are old movies or ones that do not enjoy popularity among viewers. But why not show servicemen socially relevant movies that they can talk about and discuss? Let us talk about them, and not hide them on the shelves. I would like to say the same thing about Yu. Polyakov's story "One hundred Days before the Order" and other pieces published in the periodical press about life in the army. Incidentally, some of those polled were very critical of the television program "I Serve the Soviet Union." It manifestly embellishes real life in today's army.

Lt V. Solodkov:

In fact it is not our fault that the possibilities for spiritual growth among the soldiers is sometimes limited. Take movies dealing with maritime matters. There would

seem to be many of them, but not all can be used to indoctrinate the sailors. The movie "The Lone Cruise," which was screened recently, was in no way suitable. And "Incident at Grid Reference 36-80"? How can they make such movies?

There are few good books about sailors in the navy. It is almost impossible for a sailor to find the works of V. Konetskiy and V. Pikul. How then, to propagandize naval tradition?

V. Shakhidzhanyan:

The students whom I teach have also talked about the shortcomings in esthetic indoctrination and cultural-and-enlightenment work.

What are the problems that in my opinion must be resolved? First and foremost it is essential to raise the level of training for officers and their cultural standards and their spiritual aspects. More serious attention must be given to Russian language studies with soldiers drafted from Central Asia. Links between commanders and political officers and local party and soviet organs and cultural figures must be firmer.

Is it so bad to criticize the army in the press? It is rightly said that the best way to get rid of a spot on your uniform is to make it show up. I think that press statements only help this. Including the military press.

Lt Col P. Nersesyan:

Tell us, please, according to what principle did you choose the servicemen when conducting your research?

V. Shakhidzhanyan:

Selection was random. As a rule, I invited people in military uniform at the railroad station to talk. So the figures presented here are merely information giving food for thought.

Private A. Shekhov, sapper, awarded the medal "For Valor":

Of course there are certain deviations in the military collective, and also in training. But the nature of relationships between the soldiers is not determined by this but by cohesion, friendship and combat comradeship. This is seen very graphically in Afghanistan. I well remember my own first commanders, Sgt Ayupov and Snr Sgt Gargalyk. It was they who taught me the difficult science of being a soldier and helped me to become a sapper. On difficult missions they were also the first and helped us, the new boys who had never been under fire.

Attempts are sometimes made to contrast enlisted men and officers. Why? We are doing the same thing. I do not usually use loud words, but the enlisted men truly love our regimental commander Cpt Zayev. As a demanding and fair commander who is bold in combat. As a tactful, attentive and responsive older comrade. It is largely

thanks to him that a friendly, comradely atmosphere prevails in our collective. Although I admit that my attitude is not the same as all those serving with me. Some risk their lives almost daily when they go out on missions, while others spend all their service time in the headquarters or work in the warehouse or dining hall, while everyone has the same privileges. Is this really fair?

Lt Col V. Chichko:

In the cohesion of a collective it is important to rely on the force of public opinion, the force of glasnost. Take that same story of Yu. Polyakov "One Hundred Days before the Order." The subject matter is acute and topical. We discussed the story in the subunits and then with all personnel in the unit club. We also talked with people on an individual basis. But here we tried to shape in them a correct view of the problem of nonregulation relations: not as an inevitable evil but as a shortcoming that must be decisively dealt with. A questionnaire was issued. And this is what is interesting. In response to the question "What would you like to happen today in the regiment?" 96 percent answered that they regarded it not as a holiday but just an ordinary day. Why, they asked, was it necessary artificially to heat up the problem? Incidentally, the soldiers themselves proposed that the 100 days before discharge into the reserves be designated as shock service days and they pledged to train a worthy replacement for themselves during that period.

Another question whose analysis provides food for thought: "When did you first encounter the so-called 'grandfather system'?" Some 37 percent of those polled answered in vocational and technical school, 12 percent during the journey to their service location, 24 percent in the training subdivisions and 25 percent in the regiment. These figures help us to see how to spread indoctrination efforts more correctly.

Unfortunately, some people understand the need for democratization in public life in the army as a fashionable slogan and nothing more. And they fail to see that it serves first and foremost the interests of the matter.

At the entry into our regimental headquarters hangs a box with the inscription "Your Wishes and Suggestions." Nearby is a telephone that every serviceman can use to telephone me at any time. Everyone knows that in the morning I read all the notes on a mandatory basis, and that my reaction will be immediate. About a dozen sharp signals have been sent recently. And each one was carefully studied and immediate steps taken.

Giving due consideration to the opinion of the extensive circle of communists, we have also started to resolve personnel problems. Within the regiment a certification commission has been set up, and we discuss all matters concerning the appointment of officers to higher duties and the training orientation on a collegial basis. Of

course, the commander makes the final decision. Glasnost is helping to avoid mistakes and subjectivism. And we try to review several candidates and select those most worthy.

Col Gen V. Lobov:

Let me talk about officers. They are the backbone of the Armed Forces, the bearers of its fame and tradition. I have witnessed the destinies of many officers. And I make bold to assert that they demand respect. Because the overwhelming majority of officers are people of high professionalism and a sense of responsibility for their assignments. Their active position in life, their modesty, their irreproachable moral lineament, and their steadfastness in overcoming difficulties and the deprivations of service draw us to them.

I think that it is also apropos to use another word: spirit of sacrifice. Yes, an officer sacrifices a great deal. His service is often in a remote garrison, and is associated with constant movements. His children must change schools several times. I myself have experienced these difficulties in life and managed to win through. Often a hostel or a little frame-end-panel house is all that awaits an officer, or a temporary apartment. He encounters other everyday inconveniences: no central heating, water brought in just once a day, food brought in by a shop on wheels. And an officer's pay is not as good as some uninformed people think.

What is it, then, that induces an officer to labor conscientiously and work creatively to produce results? Love for the motherland, devotion to the cause, loyalty to duty. Officers today are making a major contribution in all spheres of life in the Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, we also encounter inert people among officers, people who give nothing extra to the business. There are poorly competent workers, idle talkers and careerists. Sometimes some officers display rudeness, lack of tact, and frank indifference in their attitude toward subordinates. Today, all of this is strictly condemned. In the collectives the question is put like this: each leader must strive to show a personal example of strict observance of party and military discipline, initiative, sense of principle and conscientiousness. And this is the way to pose the question, for young people essentially put the entire Army and Navy on an equal footing with their own commanders and political officers. Military practice shows that if a soldier or sailor serves under an officer who enjoys authority, then he himself carries out his military duty conscientiously.

The work of officers is now more complex. They are aware of all the shortcomings in general educational, moral and physical preparation of the young man for military service to the motherland. If the family and society before the army has failed to instill in him a love

of labor, a sense of discipline and high civic qualities, then responsibility for this lies with all those who are obliged to deal with it. A real citizen is a fine worker and reliable soldier.

Maj V. Kozlov:

Because of the nature of my duties, each 6 months I and other officers must do what is known as passing the new recruits through our hands when they arrive at the training center. We study the documents, talk with them and make selections. And what kind of picture is painted?

General educational standards among the young soldiers are high: almost all of them have a secondary or secondary technical education. Before military service, more than 30 percent of youth have worked at industrial enterprises, on construction sites or on sovkhozes or kolkhozes. The youth replacements represent 40 nationalities. The overwhelming majority of new recruits are members of the Komsomol.

So the basic social parameters of the recruits are not bad. And we proceed from this in training-and-indoctrination work. On the whole, judging from the response among the troops, we are succeeding in training good specialists for the units and subunits.

True, it is not easy to do this. Judge for yourselves. About 60 percent of the young men arrive after graduation from the vocational and technical schools. And it is on this category of recruits, unfortunately, that the claims are made. The number of those drafted from the Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus has increased, and many of them speak Russian poorly. Up to 20 percent of the recruits we receive have been brought up in so-called troubled families. They include people with unstable mentalities.

In their work, officers face the task of making the multinational military collectives fully cohesive and of making efficient use of the arsenal of pedagogic facilities. This work is started in the military schools. Here, the course of military training and psychology must be applied in nature.

Lt Col P. Nersesyan:

I have already said that the problem of providing cohesion in multinational military collectives and instilling the standards of inter-nation dealings rests largely on the poor knowledge of the Russian language. It has been recommended that language training be provided in the army. This, of course, has been done for a long time. There is a special textbook, and the best trained officers are appointed for this purpose. In addition, special councils are set up, comprised of servicemen of non-Russian nationalities who have a good knowledge of Russian, and the members of these councils provide

assistance for commanders and political officers in conducting mass agitation work. But you will agree that at school, for 10 years the professional teachers have been unable to teach a person, while in the army in half a year we must make him a skilled specialist and give him practical language training.

I would like to express a wish. Both KOMMUNIST and KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, and indeed many other press organs rarely publish material on the social, cultural-historical and psychological features of the various nationalities and nations in our country, and on their traditions and so forth. There is little of this in the literature.

Capt P. Statsenko, commander of a radar regiment (Moscow Air Defense District)

Our conversation will be incomplete unless we say something about the conditions in which soldiers and sailors in the Army and Navy carry out their service. Unfortunately, many people have a poor knowledge of the specific nature of military labor. Our installation started out as a tent in which we spent two winters. But while we were becoming established no one relieved us of the responsibility for maintaining alert duty. I could cite dozens of examples in which compliance with tasks set by command required total self-sacrifice, courage and steadfastness. And never once have I heard complaints, either from the enlisted men and sergeants, or from the officers, about the difficulties of service life. On the contrary, in letters that I now receive from soldiers discharged to the reserve, I often read words of gratitude for the fact that the army taught them independence and tempered the character and will.

Lt V. Solodkov:

And does everyone have a good idea of what service aboard a ship is like?

Personnel aboard our escort ship, for example, spent several months on a mission in the Persian Gulf. You are well aware of the situation in that region. It is extremely unstable and explosive. Every sailor had to be vigilant and ready for action. In addition there were the frequent storms and the exhausting heat, up to 60 degrees, and almost 100-percent humidity. In short, conditions were difficult.

But typically these conditions as it were inwardly tightened people up and disciplined them. There were no serious deviations from the regulations, although there was some scoffing. This kind of cruise is difficult for the young sailors. At first not all of them were able to endure the many hours on watch and had to be relieved. Particularly those lads who had been drafted from the large cities and were accustomed to a comfortable life.

At the same time, there are many among the young sailors who are tempered in spirit and body. Take, for example, sailor Aleksey Sitnikov. I remember that we

were in a storm. We were worn out. Even some experienced specialists could not endure and asked to be relieved. But this sailor endured and stayed on watch to the end, and he did not leave his post even though he was offered a relief. Sailors who had been serving for more than a year looked to him as their example.

I would like to say that our indoctrination work with youth is considerably hampered, particularly during the first months. The young men arrive on the ship without any references from their school or last place of work, and without Komsomol references. We have to study people starting from zero, and this takes considerable time. And only clear, truthful references would be of any serious assistance in clarifying the lineament of a person.

We tried to deal with the existing situation and submitted requests. As a rule the Komsomol raykoms and schools are referred to the military registration and enlistment office, and the registration offices to the Komsomol committees and the schools. Thus, nothing is clarified.

I would like to ask the comrades from the Komsomol Central Committee the following: what does the Komsomol intend to do to improve the preparation of young men for military service? Up to now there has been little movement in this direction. To make up for this we something else. The story "One Hundred Days before the Order" is published. And this at the time of the next regular draft for service. What is the point of such a publication? What will it teach young people?

To the point, how well do our Komsomol leaders themselves know the life in the Army and Navy? Who from among the Komsomol Central Committee secretaries since the 20th CPSU Congress has been here with us in the Black Sea Fleet?

Col L. Mikhaylov, chief of the political department in the Kantemirovskiy Guards Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov

Comrade Shakhidzhanyan's statement has touched me but I sense that he has nevertheless offered a one-sided view of life in today's army. I invite him to visit our formation. We shall acquaint you with our training and the troops' everyday life. Our formation has a glorious history. But it is known not only for its combat past and traditions. The present generation of the Kantemirovskiy Division is multiplying the glory of the division with the military deeds. During the last training year 68 percent of personnel in the formation became specialists first and second class. The ranks of outstanding personnel in combat and political training swelled significantly.

Take, for example, the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col Yu. Pakhomov. This military collective is rightly considered the right-flanker, not only in the formation but also in the Ground Forces. The tank men have repeatedly demonstrated their high combat proficiency during maneuvers and gunnery exercises. Last year they sponsored socialist competition in the Ground Forces,

and personnel of the regiment fulfilled their socialist pledges. The regiment was designated outstanding. And this year it is maintaining the lead in socialist competition.

But of course, not everything runs smoothly with us. There are also complications. For example, we see the negative phenomena already talked about. We link them primarily with the shortcomings in the units and subunits in the organization of training and personnel service, and with problems in the indoctrination work of commanders and political officers. But we must also see something else. We sometimes encounter cases in which young men are obviously untrained for military service. There is a lack of understanding of its importance, a frame of mind that they will "just be away" for 2 years, and poor physical training. Typically such young people also quite often become the object of mockery and derision. It happens that things go as far as humiliation and abuse.

I would also like to say the following. Providing officers with housing remains a painful issue. It seems as if construction is done, but the state of affairs changes little. Today we have dozens of officers' families with no apartments.

We must resort to the economic method. It is apparently a good method of somehow improving the state of affairs and it has even become popular. But again, people are separated from the main thing—combat training.

Capt P. Statsenko:

In fact we military people are often diverted from fulfillment of our direct obligations and waste much time on various kinds of construction work. And this inevitably affects the quality of the training-and-indoctrination process.

The work load on officers is colossal. In my opinion, the sergeants could also handle many of the tasks that we are in charge of. But of course, it must be confessed that they do partially replace officers. In junior commanders this tutelage undermines their faith in their strength and weakens their authority. There is another reason for the relatively lowly role of sergeants. Many of them have poor special military training. The fact is that, first, selection for training subunits by the military registration and enlistment offices is often done only in a pro forma manner, mainly from figures on questionnaires. Second, they do not teach people on the courses as they should be, and instead of combat training they are often engaged in various kinds of work.

To Indoctrinate Patriots

S. Epifantsev:

The structure of military training was shaped during the initial period in the establishment of our state, and over the years has been changed only in details. Now, in

accordance with the state line, training young men for service in the Army takes place primarily in the general education schools and the vocational and technical schools. It is also done in the VUZ's with the assistance of military personnel. The DOSAAF organizations also train specialists of various kinds for service in the Armed Forces. In the matter of indoctrination for future soldiers much is also being done through the public organizations.

Today, however, we state with full justification that along with the obvious pluses, this system also has serious shortcomings.

Let us consider DOSAAF practice. By no means every rayon has facilities for training specialists.

The problem of shortages of personnel to instill in young men the skills essential for service in the Armed Forces and indoctrinate them in the heroic traditions of the past is very acute. During the postwar period veterans of the Great Patriotic War have played an invaluable role in resolving this task. But, most unfortunately, their numbers are dwindling with each passing year. Now this work is being done by young soldiers in the reserve, first and foremost those who have gone through the stern school of combat, especially those who carried out their international duty in Afghanistan. Many of them have at their own initiative become involved in the business of military-patriotic indoctrination by setting up various kinds of independent formations that young men of pre-draft age eagerly join. However, the public efforts of internationalist soldiers have for a long time not been "matched" with the activity of state organs and have not been receiving assistance and support from the Komsomol.

In 1987 the Komsomol Central Committee tried seriously to break the negative trend in this matter and make better use of the efforts of this category of reserve soldiers. The more so since the state system of military-patriotic indoctrination suffers from the significant shortcomings about which much has been said here today, and, this means, it is essential to seek out sources that would actively help it. And it is here that soldiers in the reserve can apply their efforts. They face the task of changing the entire system; it is question not only of helping it but also of augmenting it.

G. Yegorov:

I would like to cover certain questions concerning the work of our defense community. We have various kinds of military-technical schools and flying clubs to prepare young men for service in the Army and Navy. In many schools training is done at a high level. Take, for example, the flying clubs. Young men learn to fly jets and piston-engined aircraft, helicopters and gliders, and acquire the skills of night flying and flying in bad weather.

The DOSAAF primary organizations have a great deal of essential equipment and supplies at their disposal. But in terms of the entire country this is little enough, and, unfortunately, we must state that about half of the primary organizations have no base for organizing technical training or engaging in technical and military applied kinds of sports.

Much has been said and written recently about the poor physical training of young men. This problem is being resolved only poorly despite the decree on developing mass sports. Various organizations are engaged in trying to resolve it. DOSAAF is responsible for technical and military-type kinds of sports. With regard to the State Committee for Sports, in my opinion it gives its main attention to Olympic sports. I would also like to criticize the Sports Committee in the Ministry of Defense. In recent years it has no longer been involved in flying, nor in parachuting and motorcycling. These pursuits must be developed, joining forces with DOSAAF.

The number of young people engaged in military-technical kinds of sport is inadequate for our country and for the Armed Forces. In the VUZ's only two or three percent of students engage in military-technical kinds of sports. The rest sit about watching television or going to discotheques.

V. Chichko:

Many of the replacement personnel for the regiment come from the Central Asian republics. And almost all of them who have qualified as mechanic-drivers or drives in DOSAAF schools or in production training are not allowed to drive any vehicle in the regiment because of the low level of their training.

G. Yegorov:

There are problems here. Equipment provided for schools and training groups, including those in the Central Asian republics, is behind the times. The military registration and enlistment offices are not properly carrying out their tasks. Poor attendance in training groups and a large number of dropouts have been noted.

Colonel of the reserves V. Berezkin, military instructor at Moscow No 644 School:

I have now been working at the school for 10 years. And I would like to tell you about how things stand with military-patriotic indoctrination. I am very well aware that the officers sitting here are expressing dissatisfaction with respect to poor pre-draft training for our youth. We receive advertising material from the army. Why? Well, because indoctrination in the schools has been wretchedly organized; and military-patriotic indoctrination is particularly bad. I am no skeptic and I do not want to lay the paint on too thick. But this, unfortunately, is how things are. Take initial military training. Who is in charge of this? In the Ministry of Defense there is an entire department for this. It subcontracts it out to

the military registration and enlistment offices. And the offices often have no real contacts with the schools. Who should be in charge? They say the Ministry of Education. But it has no time for this. DOSAAF thinks that it has enough of its own training processes and problems, and that it cannot run the schools. And so our organizers remind us of the old adage that too many cooks spoil the broth. With regard to work outside the classroom, this is now done within the framework of the youth army division. There are games such as "Orlenok," "Zarnitsa" and "Gaydarovets." These are led by the Komsomol Central Committee. But at the local level few people take the games seriously. I judge this from my own region.

There is no leadership system and no control. This is why, like me, reserve officers who have been assigned this duty are virtually left to stew in their own juice. Each of us has to do what he can.

A. Kurasov, first secretary of the Bryansk City CPSU Gorkom

I agree with the military instructor when he said that we have many organizations involved in military training for youth and none of them is answerable to anyone for quality. Someone should coordinate and direct this work. I think that this should be primarily the party organs at the local level.

Let me tell you how things stand with us in Bryansk. Each year in the party gorkom buro we confirm a special plan for measures that provide for the coordination of efforts by all organizations involved in military-patriotic indoctrination, including the political workers in the subunits stationed on city territory. A military-patriotic department under the party gorkom has been set up and has for several years been functioning on a public basis. It includes people who have enormous experience in relevant work. This department is led by D.Ya. Dudnikov. A Bryansk section of the Council of War Veterans also operates, directing the work of all possible kinds of clubs. One such formation is the young parachutists club. We have organized pretty good training for lads who intend to enroll in military schools. Over the past 10 years some 500 people have been trained for the military schools in the "Zvezda" club, set up at the garrison. The club is led by S. Osipenko.

Maj Gen L. Seleznev, military commissar in Kiev city

I think that indoctrination and preparation for service in the army should be carried out not by a single military instructor but first and foremost by parents; and if a youth learns how to wind a foot cloth at home, and to sew his collars and much else, then it will be easier for him to serve in the army. More skillful comrades will not laugh at him and he will quickly get his bearings and become a soldier. And in this sense, any teacher can do much here.

A. Anfinogenov:

Attention has rightly been drawn to the shortcomings in our schools as the root of many evils. With regard to the army, it seems to me that as before it remains outside

any broad public influence. On the one hand, of course, this is determined by the special conditions existing in the army. But the people's interest in the Armed Forces is their special pride, something extraordinarily sacred (for one way or another almost everyone has been in the army or associated with it in some way). What happens in the army affects each Soviet person and every Soviet family in the most profound way. But what is this interest? Sometimes it is a guarded interest. With tears in her eyes, one mother says "My boy is going into the army." "Well, that's just fine" "No, no, no, no..." "What is the matter?" "No, no, you do not know, you do not know..." Of course, everyone understands what is going on here. It is the guarded attitude of a mother to the fact that her sons must go into the army that should really worry us.

Or take another issue. Why does the young soldier not wear the combat order awarded to him? Here, in my opinion, there has been a certain devaluation. And it must be frankly stated that this occurred in the atmosphere of political irresponsibility and the servility of the period of stagnation, when in an hour we had Thrice or Four-time Heroes, for no one knew what services, while people who had really carried out their duty honestly, the true heroes who had with their blood or life or labor really deserved such honors, received nothing.

G Yegorov:

I do not wish to cast a shadow over all our youth; the overwhelming majority is, as they say, ready to go through fire and water if necessary to defend our motherland. But there have been cases of the evasion of service in the Army. These are simply coddled and spoiled brats. There have often been cases in which a draftee tries with all his might to avoid service in the Navy. But why? Simply because he has to serve 3 years in the Navy and only 2 years in the Army. But previously people used to take pride in service in the Navy.

Maj Gen L. Seleznev:

Sometimes parents come to me and ask, either directly or indirectly the following question: "What can be done so that my son does not have to serve in the army? What is required for this?" I think that the press should give this more attention. It is the law. When a young man attains the age of 18 he must spend two or three years in the army. It is mandatory. For everyone. When this has sunk into everyone's consciousness there will be no redundant questions and people will prepare seriously for service in the army.

Col L. Mikhaylov:

Attitudes toward the army must not be tendentious. This question must be approached comprehensively, in-depth and attentively. We do have many shortcomings. As a communist and political worker I must admit that we have not become accustomed to criticism directed at us,

because previously our shortcomings were not reflected in the press. The television program "I Serve the Soviet Union," and also our army newspapers, have talked mainly about positive experience. And so in the reportages and photographs much now seems artificial and affected. The work of the press and of radio and television must be perfected. They must provide good, rich material, first and foremost for the young men who are preparing for service, so that they may have not an artificial but a real idea about the army.

S. Epifantsev:

Attitudes toward the army depend largely on how the state and public organizations deal with the needs, inquires and interests of those who are serving and have been discharged into the reserve. On how society in general regards the perpetuation of the memory of those who have fallen, and the needs of their families.

The question has been asked here as to why some of the young men decorated for their exploits in Afghanistan do not wear their well-deserved orders and medals. It is because the orders and medals that they have received are not simply awards but a symbol and sign used to get society's attention. And when this attention and concern is real not shown in other things, apart from the medals themselves, then the young men begin to doubt. I shall not cite examples of the bureaucratic circumstances in which awards are sometimes presented, but these things do happen. What we are doing now is trying to find new approaches. In Leningrad recently these awards were presented in the presence of veterans. Today it is essential to raise the public status of the awards.

Something more must also be said about the needs of our internationalist soldiers. I am not going to talk about privileges; this is an old issue and the essential nature of it is clear. But we must certainly pose more broadly the issue of showing humane attention to veterans of the Great Patriotic War and to those who have distinguished themselves in these times. Many of them ask no kinds of privileges for themselves. In a recent conversation with internationalist soldiers the talk was not about privileges for themselves in, say terms of apartments. They talked about wounded comrades and about how certain matters should be taken up seriously with the Ministry of Health. For there are young men who have been unjustifiably removed from the disabled group. In short, there must be constant humane participation in resolving the fates of these young men.

And another question: attention to the memorials to those who have fallen. I would like to talk about operation "Kommunar," which was conducted by members of the Komsomol in Sverdlovsk. They had noticed that the local cemetery was being neglected, was in a state of dilapidation. And people who had taken part in the revolution and the civil war, people who had been

posthumously rehabilitated were buried there. The young people are putting everything in good order, collecting funds and organizing a service to maintain the memorial.

Rejoinder:

What is astonishing is that in some places they build a ceremonial monument while in Rzhev unburied bodies are still lying about...

S. Epifantsev:

This is what we are doing: this year, we (and the Ministry of Defense has been helping) have been doing this work in Smolensk Oblast. Next year we shall be working in Pskov, Novgorod and Kalinin oblasts and again in Smolensk Oblast. The entire territory will be studied very carefully. Of course, we shall also probably ask the military for assistance. Work is now being completed on extricating an aircraft in Smolensk Oblast. For two-and-a-half months a search detachment from Leninskiy rayon in Moscow, whose members are workers in the Moscow metro system, students from secondary school No 712 and troops from the Moscow Military District have been working under very complicated conditions, in mud and swamps.

What prompts them to do this? The main thing is a desire to investigate independently what happened, a desire to restore the good names of the dead heroes and to prove that they are not forgotten, that they live in our memory. A keen memory that also helps us in our affairs today.

From the editor:

Those participating in this round-table conversation were undoubtedly unable to cover all the problems associated with the history and present-day situation in the Armed Forces and training for young men. Many complicated issues have only been mentioned.

The merits of the Armed Forces are universally recognized. Our army possesses a powerful potential, both military-technical and moral-and-political. Historical experience in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces testifies that it is precisely the fundamentally new sociopolitical and moral substance that determines the strength of the Soviet Army as an army of the new type, an army of the people, an army of a socialist country.

The deep sources of the might of the Army and Navy lie in consanguineous unity with the people. In close contact with the local party and soviet organs and the labor collectives, the military councils, commanders, political officers and party and Komsomol organizations are trying to raise the social activeness of servicemen and increase their interest in conscientious service and a sense of responsibility for the security of the Soviet state.

Within the Army, as within the country as a whole, perestroika is taking place. Methods of leadership in the troops are being renewed, the effectiveness of the training process is being improved, and democracy in intraparty life and in all army life is being expanded. On the basis of glasnost and with the active participation of party and Komsomol organizations and all servicemen, a decisive struggle is being waged against oversimplification and molycoddling in combat training, and against carelessness and violations of military discipline and other negative phenomena.

The main conclusion reached by those taking part in this round-table discussion is that the Soviet Armed Forces stand vigilantly on guard over the gains of the October and are reliably protecting the peaceful labor of our people, directed toward achieving a qualitatively new condition for society.

09642

Call for Limited Tenure for Party Posts in the Military

18010241 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 April 88 p 1

[Letter to the editor by Lt Col V. Katarushkin, party bureau secretary, Belorussian Military District; "The Border of the Problem" under the rubric "Letters About Restructuring"]

[Text] The need for the democratization of party life, I think, also brings forward such a problem as the dynamism of party leadership, the inflow of fresh forces. Ten or fifteen years in the position of partkom or party bureau secretary—is this not an anachronism? For after such a period of time one becomes tired, most likely, not only of leading conferences and meetings. At this point one must see the minutes of the meetings in one's sleep.

Moreover, someone else, occupying a high party post for a long time can at times become isolated from the masses, get used to shortcomings, conduct himself haughtily, become surrounded by time-servers, by those who seek more to please than to fulfill their responsibilities. I emphasize: it stands to reason that not all become like this after long years of service in an elected position. But even if this is only true of a certain part, then there is little good here. Therefore, I support the pronouncement of the communists at our meetings about the necessity to clearly limit the tenure of party members in elected party positions in the military.

Responsibility of Higher Officers for Hazing Stressed

18010304 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by A. Khorev: "Beyond the Black Line"]

[Text] Rereading "Tikhiy Don" [And Quiet Flows the Don] by Sholokhov, I involuntarily paid attention to the following lines: "Kryuchkov was an 'old' Cossack; i.e., serving his last year of mandatory service, and by the unwritten law of the regiment had the right, as did any 'old' Cossack, to send the young ones on errands, drill them, or for any trivial misdeed add on distance between stops to feed and rest the horses. It was established thus: a Cossack drafted in 1913 who had committed an offense was required to feed and rest the horses at 13 stops; one drafted in 1914 was required to do so at 14 stops. The cavalry sergeant majors and officers encouraged this procedure, believing that this imbued in the Cossacks the concept of obedience to seniors not only in rank, but also in age."

These lines never left any impression in my mind before, although I read the novel not only in my school years, but also as a soldier. Why would this be? Probably because there was then nothing at all like this in army life, and this information about Cossacks was perceived as something remote, abstract and unreal. Along with us 17 year olds at the end of the war served both soldiers in their mandatory term of service, and those from the pre-war callup period, who had experienced the front, and had wounds and awards. It seemed that they had the moral right to look at us, who had not smelled the powder, condescendingly, and to demand some special respect. But, they had a truly brotherly attitude toward us.

During five years of mandatory service I served in several subunits and units. Since, for several years after the war there was no callup, everywhere I turned out to be junior, both in age and in term of service. And no one, ever, anywhere made any claims either to my portion of sugar or to my services in cleaning his clothing or shoes. And even less did anyone raise his hand to me, threaten me, or try to "send me on errands" or "drive" me.

In this bright background, Cossack Kryuchkov of the old regime saw, naturally, some prehistoric dinosaur, and the unwritten laws of his regiment as an old unremembered absurdity. It was also essentially a perception of the Cossacks that was not far from the truth, in the political and moral sense. For hundreds of years Cossacks in Russia were a military estate, which served in return for preferential use of the land. Cossacks served for 25, and later for 18-20 years. In return for their service, they received land allotments for their permanent use of up to 30 dessiatina. Czarism supported the privileged position of the Cossacks in every way, and made wide use of the Cossack troops for police functions. Grilled by many years of service, and accustomed

to "working" by the whip in dispersing workers' demonstrations, some half-literate cossacks did not see anything shameful in "adding on feeding times" also to their young fellow soldier. For them this type of behavior is to a certain extent explainable and understandable.

However, even in the old czarist army the attitude toward the Cossacks and their traditions and customs was far from unambiguous. Their military qualities were studied and respected. Suvorov himself stated that the Cossacks were the eyes and ears of the army. But about their cruel customs and their gendarmery ways an apt saying developed: "Kazaki obychayem sobaki" [loosely translated: Cossack ways are those of dogs].

From the very beginning the attitude of Red Army soldiers toward these "dog-like" ways was even more disapproving. The comradeship characteristic of Russian soldiers from days of yore developed still further and grew stronger. "I will die myself, but I will help my comrade" became not only an ideal, but a norm of behavior.

And how can it be understood, and how can one explain that extraordinary circumstance that in some interval of time in our army there suddenly began to re-emerge the notorious stratification of soldiers by terms of service—from "salagi" [raw recruits] to "dedy" [grandfathers]? How, finally, is this compatible with the level of education of today's soldiers, with the term of service, which has been reduced to 2 years, and with the social and political status of the Soviet soldier?

Some of today's "grandfathers" differ little in terms of their level and nature of their claims to privileges in service from the old-regime Cossack Kryuchkov. Some of them literally attempt to terrorize the young soldiers.

"Recently," wrote Private A. Tikhonov from the Volga Military District, "I almost committed suicide. The doctors saved my life. Senior soldiers S. Manakhov and Zh. Ayvazyan forced me to commit such an act through their mockery. I had to stand in the stairway until I dropped to warn these barracks hooligans of the approach of the duty officer, and had to clean their clothes and make their beds. I reported this to the commanders. A criminal proceeding was initiated against Manakhov and Ayvazyan, but was then halted. They were given disciplinary punishment and now they avenge themselves against me in every way..."

The matter ended, according to the report we received from the district political directorate, with Private Tikhonov being transferred to another unit, and with the strict punishment of his former commander.

Manakhov and Ayvazyan, having balanced on the edge of criminality, got off with a light scare. Perhaps they even secretly believe that they defeated Tikhonov. Only what sort of a victory is it? It is a shame and disgrace to

trample and offend those who are weak, and it is a crime against morality, and against that which is most dear in relations among men—comradeship.

Let us recall the famous statement by Gogol: "There is nothing more sacred than comradeship!" Sholokhov's ignorant Cossack may not have known these inspirational words. But we have known them from childhood. The generations of our fathers and grandfathers, who gained the great victory in the great war, were brought up on them. Soldierly comradeship and mutual assistance were their true and reliable allies in achieving that victory. Ask any veteran and he will confirm this. But read, for example, this paragraph from the novel "Okruzheniye" by the front line writer S. Krutilin, about how a wounded comrade was carried: "All members of the battery carried him in turn. Every four hours we changed shifts, but nevertheless by morning the lads could barely stand on their feet. My shoulders ached from the stretcher, and I lifted up its handles a bit, but had enough strength only for one or two minutes. My legs gave way..."

I know what those who deviate from military discipline such as Manakhov and Ayvazyan will answer to this. They will say that in combat they would act just like the front line soldiers, and would not abandon their wounded comrade. This is, as we say, a fresh tradition, but it is hard to believe. Age old experience shows that in battle, as in life, not accidents but laws reign. However, let us even allow that, in wartime, a sponger will be reforged into a good comrade... Let him recall that, as the philosophers say, what happened must not be done by him.

Let him imagine the measure of his shame and depth of his repentance, if he himself ended up in the place of this wounded comrade...

And even outside of combat, life frequently gives instructive lessons in repentance to presumptuous hooligans.

In front of me is a letter received by the deputy commander for political affairs of one of the regiments in the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District. Perhaps it even contains some emotional exaggerations, but we will present it as it is.

"Comrade Major!

Former soldier and today prisoner Kozlov-Aleksandr, sentenced to 5 years of deprivation of freedom in an intense regime labor colony, writes to you.

It is painful for me to acknowledge now that everything happened just as you said. Now I understand well all the demands that our commanders made upon us.

You constantly told us that we must respect Soviet laws, since the law is just, but very strict toward those who violate it. It seemed to me that all of this was only words, and that nothing would happen to me. I understand that you often pitied us, and made allowances for our youth, and we incorrectly understood this, believing that everything would pass without punishment. But in the end was a military tribunal. Here they reminded me of everything: my bouts of drunkenness, unauthorized absences, crudeness, non-regulation relationships, and unwillingness to obey regulations. And we had only two more weeks to serve. And we did a "transfer of young soldiers," and this was the last straw. The next morning I also still believed that you and the commander were simply frightening us. And only when I was sitting in the KPZ [pre-trial detention cell] along with the other fellows did we realize that we had already gone past the black line. They gave me five years; Zhenya Ivanov four years; Sasha Krivko and Volodya Tumanov three years.

In court my father said: "From this day I have no son." How sad that was to hear. Only my sister writes me from home. After the trial Mama was paralyzed, and my father has rejected me. Yes, I can understand him. He put so much effort into raising me. He is an invalid of the second group and worked in two jobs so that I could study in technical school. And I stabbed him in the heart like that. Who needs a criminal son? Lyuda also sent me a letter, saying that she did not need a criminal husband. And I thought all the time about seeing my friends and loved ones, and what happened was a meeting in a prison cell.

Now every day I return in my mind to the past, to my army service. Now I can call these days happiness, since, having lost my freedom and being behind prison bars, I feel especially keenly what I have lost. I remember when Lyuda came to see me on a holiday and I stood in ranks. You did everything to get me off work, and took Lyuda into your home.

Now I am prepared to ask your forgiveness on my knees for every mean thing I did to you. After the trial and after the sentence I ended up in Gorkiy Oblast in the forest exploitation area. The first months are terrible to recall. There was not enough food. My legs were always wet and cold and I felt sorry for myself for everything, for the fact that I was guilty, and for the fact that it is true that they constantly taunt me since I am in prison for the first time. They beat me unmercifully one time and made an obscene tattoo on my chest. They treat especially badly those who are in prison according to the military article, and say: "You reptiles first serve the motherland honorably and then get into trouble, all the way to bread and water if you like."

The work is very hard, and we are so exhausted by evening that we are hardly able to drag our legs along. The norm is large, and if we do not fulfill it, good days do not go into the record, and we are also deprived of meetings and coupons for the store. After the bell rings, as you are lying there it is as though you collapse, only in the morning you

jump up at the sound of the bell. Here at reveille you do not stretch yourself, since immediately you will be punished, either by being sent to isolation, or by being deprived of privileges. When I received a package from my sister, the other prisoners took everything, and left only a packet of biscuits.

Now I understand well what scoundrels we were when we offended our own comrades, the young soldiers, and believed that everything was permitted for the "old timers." Now I would break the hand of anyone who would raise a hand to a young soldier. It is mean and is very costly, if someone does not believe me, let him go to my place, and no conversations are necessary.

I am now ready not only to wash, but even to lick the floors of the entire barracks with my tongue, and work day and night, if I could only turn everything back. But I have no one to blame; I messed up my life myself, and this is my payment.

A little more than a year has passed, but what long and tormented days they were. I remember army service as heaven. I will be in prison for more than three and a half more years. There are not enough words and manly tears, it is so hard to look ahead. All of my friends became people, and I became a criminal. I lost my parents, lost my family, and can blame only myself. I found what I was looking for, as the battalion commander said. It is all true. I myself walked this road, began with little things and ended up in prison.

Comrade Major! Read this letter to the soldiers; the former young soldiers still remember me. They have already become the senior group. I ask forgiveness of everyone and ask that they think about their own lives. It is very easy to spoil it and stumble and fall through youth and foolishness, and it will take their whole lives to get up and wash off the shame. And in order to understand this it is not necessary to sit in the dock; that is too high a price to pay for enlightenment.

It is better to listen in time to what the commanders say and what they teach, for their words are not empty sounds, and they have life experience. I myself am an example.

Who needs me now? No one. I myself crossed off my life. Who will need me after prison? How heavy and sick at heart I am. I would not wish this fate to my worst enemy.

Say a kind word for me. I ask you for the last time to believe me; now I have a different attitude about my word. During my entire term in prison I have not had a single violation and have become a "shock worker," but it is very difficult to get amnesty or a favorable record in an intense regime if no one will help. If you do not wish to do so, I will not be offended at you. I betrayed you too many times.

Again I request forgiveness of you and of all the soldiers.

Goodbye.

With respect, former private and now prisoner Kozlov, Aleksandr.

My address: Gorkiy Oblast P.O. Box UZ-18/321."

Here the question cannot help but arise: who is at fault? Former soldier Kozlov is inclined to place all the blame on himself. For him this position, of course, is the only correct one. From this position it is useful to look not only at his past, but also especially at the future. You see, neither Kozlov, nor any other soldier, strictly speaking, has or can have any objective reasons for such a fall. If, of course, one does not consider an objective reason the fact that for some of today's youth civil, moral, and social maturation for some reason lag greatly behind their natural and physical maturation. Even at 20 years of age some are not yet fully conscious of their responsibility for their behavior, to their country, their family, their comrades, and ultimately to themselves. And for this he cannot, of course, take away his own guilt, for self education is also a civil duty of everyone. But, socialist society is so structured that around each of us there are still teachers. And if they do not take on their own share of blame for what happened, they thereby will place in doubt their own pedagogical competence, and even more than that their understanding of their place in life.

So, we are speaking about pedagogical competence and one's place in life.

The political worker, having received this repentent letter from prisoner Kozlov, is perhaps flattered by the trust of the former soldier and his comments about him. But, most of all he must think about his methods of working with people, and about the effectiveness of his words and his ability to convince people. After all, no matter how it is justified and how it is explained, the fact is apparent that neither the commander, nor the political worker were able, although they tried, to prevent Kozlov's crime, the catastrophe of his life, and the damage to the service that he did. And efforts that do not bring results, perhaps do not merit condemnation, but also do not merit approval.

The mother of another former soldier, also convicted for mocking a fellow soldier, sent the editors a bitter letter with reproaches toward his former commanders. The reproaches were fair in principle. The subunit where her son served lacked necessary order, and non-regulation relationships reigned concerning soldiers of different callup periods. "When my son was a junior soldier," writes his mother, "the senior soldiers mocked him. When he became an 'old man,' he himself began to mock the junior soldiers. I did not teach him to do bad things. Neither did his father. Our son left for the army with a favorable recommendation from his work. That means that he learned everything bad in the army..."

The mother's grief is understandable, but the categorical nature of her condemnations is doubtful. None of his commanders taught her son to be bad either; there can be no doubt of this. It is true that they were unable to implement the necessary control, restrain him from unworthy behavior, or prevent the crime. But these are all different things just the same.

It is a pity that the mother does not find her own omissions in the upbringing of her son.

This expression has grown up in the midst of the people and today become popular: the conscience is the best controller. This is very correctly and very wisely noted! It is precisely and truly so: In any matter the main, strictest, most competent and most incorruptible controller is our conscience. You cannot fool it, betray it, move it to pity, throw sand in its eyes, hide from it, or set up a "warning post" on the stairwell, as against the unit duty officer. The worth of all teachers in the moral perfection of their pupil amounts in the end to the fact that they were able to inculcate in him, and develop in him sufficiently this saving and all-powerful sense—the conscience.

Like any complex social concept it includes numerous components. Chief among them are social, moral and cultural maturity. The soldiers of the Great Patriotic War period, as those of the first post-war decades, were undoubtedly inferior to today's in their education level. But in their level of maturity they were greatly superior. By the time of their callup into the army their adolescent inclination toward mischief, naughtiness and obstinance were already far behind them. It was supplanted by entirely mature concerns about family, about themselves, and about their daily bread. Today, even at the moment they are discharged into the reserves, some of the soldiers still play and kick up their heels without a care, like a young horse in his first furrow... In a blissful state of mindless play he also crosses that fatal line that former soldier, and today prisoner Kozlov, with the awakened conscience, aptly called "black" in his letter.

Thus, the fault of each of his teachers in the crime against morality that their pupil committed also amounts in the end to the inability to root out and nullify that very ill-fated adolescent inclination toward obstinance, and replace it with a wholesome sense of conscience.

With this approach to the question, "Who is at fault?" the circle of people involved in responsibility for the so-called non-regulation attitudes among soldiers inevitably widens. Commanders and political officers, as before, of course remain in the center of this circle. But, parents are also responsible, who were unable back in early childhood to inculcate in their child a correct understanding of what is good and bad, and immunize him against bad influences, doubt that they did everything they should of done; and kindergarten teachers recognize that they wrongly did not ascribe importance to how the older children sometimes humiliated the younger; and the school teacher is sorry that he did not sufficiently use existing possibilities, for example in literature lessons, to celebrate the beauty and strength of soldierly comradeship; and the poet, who did not write effective poems on friendship among soldiers, and feels himself to be indebted to the army; and the journalist, who did not say the words about barracks hooligans that would force them to stop and look around, begins to seek such words...

And, in the consciousness of the young "hotshots," who are amazed at the width of their shoulders, but do not shine with social maturity, will sooner and more truly take place that necessary and beneficial leap, as a result of which their claims to privileges at the expense of their junior fellow soldiers, their infringements on the worth of their comrades, and attempts to destroy our very military comradeship, will be seen in their own eyes in the same real, loathsome light, in which they are seen today by all of our society.

It has been noted long ago and accurately that the army is a copy of society. All of the best in it is from the people. And everything that is alien to it and superficial is from the same source. The successes of the army make everyone happy. The problems are also not a matter of indifference to anyone, and they can be solved better through common efforts.

9069

Pact Officers on Language Barrier, Need for Student Exchanges

18010243 [Editorial report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 April 1988 carries on page 3 an interview of a Soviet Major V. Pyzhov and a Polish Lt Col A. Kovalchik conducted by Lt Col A. Manushkin on the occasion of a joint military exercise entitled "Experience Is Obtained in the Field." Towards the end of the interview Pyzhov states: "I will say self-critically: I for example am ashamed that I still do not know Polish. But can it be that the problem rests solely with me? In our regiment, for example, Major Valeriy Ivanovich Ignatov, the unit zampolit, speaks Polish well. But he studied in Warsaw in the military academy. And the rest? It happens that an officer will serve a tour in the Northern Group and not be able to string together ten words in Polish. And so I think: Why not create in our units Polish language circles?"

Kovalchik then states: "I would also like to mention the positive influence which a military academy student exchange would have on the strengthening of fraternal ties. In our regiment there are also officers who have

graduated from Soviet academies. In particular my deputy Captain Yuzef Dobrovolskiy. But I often think about how much it would help the matter if among the platoon and company commanders in our regiment there were as few as two or three who had graduated from Soviet military schools. And in the Soviet subunits corresponding graduates of Polish military schools. How that would facilitate tactical command and control in the course of training exercises and mutual understanding at all stages of the field exercise."

The article concludes with a statement by Pyzhov: "And the final, in my opinion, substantial observation. You cannot find even a small Russian-Polish dictionary in a single one of the Northern Group of Forces' Military Training Organization's bookstores. It is not even worth mentioning a Russian-Polish phrasebook—they are as rare as hen's teeth.

"It seems that such a problem (a shortage of dictionaries and phrasebooks) also exists in the Central and Southern Groups of Forces as well as in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. Voenizdat produces quite a bit; why can't our publishers help us in this matter?"

Engineer Commander Complains of Troop Quality to Uzbek Minister

18010311 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Col O. Nikonov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Restructuring: A Communist Position": "A Deputy's Inquiry. Addressed by the Commander of 'N' Unit to the Uzbek SSR Minister of Education"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel V. Mashchitskiy, commander of an engineer regiment, wrote a letter to O. Abbasova, Uzbekistan minister of education. No, it was not a letter of a personal nature, but one that was quite official. It did not bear the stamp of the military unit, but, as the saying goes, it was written on the letterhead of the municipal Soviet of People's Deputies.

"Dear Oydin Salikhovna! I am writing to you—Uzbekistan's minister of education and a member of the government of the republic, as a deputy of the municipal Soviet of People's Deputies, for the purpose of exerting a joint influence on the existing state of affairs in the Uzbek SSR in military patriotic work with young people, in particular on the question of preparing them for service in the army. I know from my own experience that this work is still not being conducted with adequate effectiveness and quality.

"Thus, a number of graduates of secondary general education schools of the Tashkentskaya, Andizhanskaya, Kashkadarinskaya, Khorezmskaya, Namanganskaya and Bukharskaya Oblasts are weak in the Russian language—a language of international communications. The reason, as it becomes apparent from conversations with young soldiers, does not lie in the difficulty of mastering the language, but in poorly organized control over the work of teachers. According to the admissions of young soldiers—Privates U. Tukhtayev, Z. Babazhanov, A. Karimov, A. Turayev, Z. Parmanov, I. Khalikov and others, Russian language lessons were held irregularly, and they were frequently interrupted and postponed. At the same time, all of the aforementioned soldiers for some reason were certified with excellent or good grades, just as they were, incidentally, in physical training as well. Meanwhile, the physical training of many of them leaves a lot to be desired.

"Undoubtedly, I would also be able to give you dozens of names of soldiers who were drafted into the army from cities and oblasts of the republic who were far better prepared. They fit into the military system immediately, they successfully master military specialties, and they perform their duty faultlessly. But we are not talking about them now. I consider that, in the method of approach itself to patriotic military work, young people must be educated during their school years to give all of their best qualities to the sacred duty of defending the motherland.

"I hope, dear Oydin Salikhovna, that you will understand me correctly, and that in the very near future our subunits will be augmented by young people from glorious Uzbekistan who are better prepared for military service.

"I wish you good health and great success in your work.

Lt Col Mashchitskiy, V. P."

I did not begin to ask Vladimir Pavlovich why he specifically sent his inquiry to Tashkent, inasmuch as I was at another regiment before where the commander talked about these very same problems: they work unproductively, with large losses in labor costs, because with every arrival of replacements they are busy with correcting the defective work of thousands of other people.

"But their work is paid for," he remarked, not without a hint. "That is why in the first months, by taking some time from combat training, we devote ourselves to teaching the men the Russian language and physical training, and at times, paradoxically, we have to teach them rules of personal hygiene: brush your teeth mornings and evenings, and wash your hands before meals. One immediately visualizes a crowd of parents, kindergarten teachers, school teachers and experts in industrial training. I would grade all of them in their labor book with a fat '2' for such work, and if it were legal I would deprive them of bonuses for the entire period of the soldier's service. . . "

A joke? No, because the matter is very serious: out of 100 replacements at one time, 44 were called up for this unit from Uzbekistan. I had talks with a majority of them. About school, and about the SPTU [Rural Professional Technical School] where some of them had studied. Private A. Bebetov from Bukhara: "Our SPTU-4 does not give basic military training." Private Kh. Mirzaparov from Tashkent: "I rarely saw Russian language teachers; there was no time to conduct lessons for this. Also, our group, which had 30 persons, did not engage in physical training. But at the end we were all given good grades." Private F. Khamrayev from the Alatskiy Rayon: "I read Russian poorly. The teacher gave everyone a '4' and said that we will be taught in the army." Private G. Mukhtarov completed secondary school in the kholkoz "Pravda" in Bukharskaya Oblast. His documents mention that he is a VKLSM member, a sportsman and that he completed basic military training with a grade of "excellent." But in reality they did not engage in basic military training there at all. Private O. Kuchkarov told about an absolutely amazing case. An entire group from technical school No 53, and this is 24 persons, went and "joined" the Komsomol. At the same time they were also given the GTO badge.

The first thought that arises from such an unobtrusive revelation: Why are we being deceptive and whom are we deceiving? All of us—those who teach young people and those who send them into military service. How aloof must one be from his work in order not to think:

but this young fellow, who has not been taught the driver's profession, transports people and ammunition; and that one takes part with full combat gear in a short double-time forced march or carries a mortar plate. It is not excluded that this could happen under fire, let us say, from dushmans. But he cannot even chin himself on a horizontal bar three times. I agree without hesitation: the problems are simple. But they are of the kind where the question concerns elementary civic decency, honesty in work and a good attitude toward young boys who will leave you and your school lessons to serve, and their soldier's good fortune in many ways will depend on what and how you teach them: whether they make it in the service or not, and whether service life will be a joy or burden for them.

Of course, each unprepared soldier in the unit gets additional training. Classes in the Russian language and other subjects of the school curriculum have also been organized in Mashchitskiy's regiment and in another regiment. But let us look at this in a proper way. Additional classes represent time that cannot be replaced and the efforts of many specialists are distracted from the resolution of complex combat readiness tasks. And here, it seems to me, the commander of the regiment is absolutely right when he says that it is time for the army, which is a kind of quality control of the country's educational system, to give an appraisal of already paid for social labor in the training of young people in the fulfillment of their constitutional obligation. How this will be expressed, and with what kind of indices and sanctions, is another question. The method of approach itself is important. For it was previously considered somehow even improper, when referring to one or another draftee, to imply to parents, the school or to PTU [Professional Technical School] boards or a plant that they reared for the army, and consequently for the country, let us say, a defender who on the whole was not very reliable. A person without principles, good habits and skills in taking care of himself. They reared them and sent them off, they say, to serve, to learn. Thus, over the years a kind of phenomenon of dependency has formed itself in society. Even the high and in principle correct thesis "the army is a school of life and a school of upbringing" began to be used as a justifying argument. And ordinarily this very important question did not arise and was not posed: "And what was there up to the army?"

But let us now look at the problem from a broader perspective. There frequently come into the army not only young men who are simply not trained in one of the military specialities. Together with those who have a grownup and proper attitude toward life and the service, there also come people with an eroded social psychology, the psychology of that very unpredictable "street"—rokery, panki, metallists, etc. [street gang names]; that is, "neformaly" [nonconformists], whose numbers, alas, are not decreasing. What do they bring with themselves into the army? This question tops all others. Yesterday the teen-ager was a student studying in a PTU or in a

technical secondary school. Today he is a soldier. And in the meantime nothing has changed in his social psychology, because, and this is also the truth, the street in many, many cases prepared him most effectively for the service with a merciless clannish mentality, or he was prepared at a PTU hostel, where, alas, the "law of force" has still not been eradicated: the juniors submit themselves to the seniors and, if they do not, they are beaten.

It goes without saying that now the theoreticians who study the problems of youth are pertinaciously analyzing the deep sources of these phenomena. But now we are discussing everyday practices.

Groups of teen-agers, loitering with their extremely loud tape recorders, sitting on the steps of stairwells with bored looks, form a picture that is painfully familiar to everyone. These groups in themselves are a source of anxiety, and even of crime that is latently festering in their own environment. In the beginning, the naive aggressiveness of some teen-agers finds its expression in hooliganism, insults, caddishness, and afterwards. . . But then the police come into the picture.

Thus, after or before intervention by the police these teen-agers, having grown somewhat older, come to the army. To whom does one complain when serious situations arise in relationships among them in some subunit, and which then almost become a "discovery" on the pages of a newspaper or magazine? For example, the facts are glaring and the comments are critical, and the position is one-sided, and frequently also malicious. And there is no feeling of pain over what has occurred in one's own home, and one does not see a concerned look—except for what can and should be done in order to get over this as quickly as possible.

The medical doctors are brilliantly correct when they say that it is easier to prevent an illness than it is to treat it, and preventive medicine is the foundation of health.

Vladimir Pavlovich Mashchitskiy understood this so well that he did not wait for any kind of recommendations from above. As a deputy of a city soviet—a government official—he sent his distress signal, thinking that he would be heard. Besides, he was also convinced of another thing: of a deputy's right, and almost all military commissars and an overwhelming majority of commanders and chiefs of political organs are deputies of soviets and have real governmental authority locally, but, as a rule, they do not apply it in behalf of preparing young people for the service. But the right granted by the people is great, and here one can no longer just represent the armed forces in the soviets.

And Vladimir Pavlovich has good reason to be concerned. His regiment has not had any incidents for several years, and the unit's discipline is considered to be all right. But there is no guarantee that something like that will not happen tomorrow.

But this is not all. No person lives outside society, and if he does not wish people around him well then he, his sons or his pupils bring egoism with them into the army. That is the dialectic. If he does not set an example of mutual help for the people around him, then he, his sons or pupils bring indifference into the army. If he continually seeks personal gain, then he brings cruelty into life. To whom is a regimental commander to address his questions if not to the parents and teachers? And the questions are not always biased. Does he have a right to reciprocal claims? I think that he does. Why complain about the lingering social growing up of the young people and their infantilism, when the best medicine for this ailment is work.

"And we, when discussing the work with replacements at the party buro, have been reduced to despair," Mashchitskiy confided in me during a conversation. "It turns out that not many of our lads have been trained to work or have solid skills. And do you know what has perplexed the communists? The future. . . We read in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA that from 74 to 90 percent of today's pupils who were polled in various regions of the country do not like work and despise work. And only 5 to 8 percent like to work. That is, we are not wrong in our conclusions and forecasts. And we have to take vigorous measures so that we are not late with the cure. For it is known: the idle person has almost always been the carrier of vice. He does not understand and he does not like working people, and therefore he is deprived of a sense of social concerns. A person of this kind also does not have a feeling for the motherland, for his feeling is elsewhere, where it is easier to live, where life is carefree. How can we together entrust him tomorrow with the defense of the motherland, with our past and our future?"

Now I think it is clear why Deputy V. Mashchitskiy was charged by the communists in the regiment to send an inquiry to the minister of education, although only to one of the republics for the time being. . .

"You see, we are firmly convinced," added Vladimir Pavlovich while taking a file on the inquiry out of a folder with the inscription 'Deputy correspondence,' "that today a 'difficult' soldier is no longer acceptable to the army. Difficult, that is, poorly educated and unsuitable for the conventional and stereotypical pedagogic methods, and simply put, even uneconomical."

And he talked about how, while preparing junior drivers for a long march last autumn, he was forced to dismiss six soldiers because they were unfit. But manpower and resources were expended in their training. Still, as the saying goes, one of them was not spotted, and in the march, not knowing how to drive, he overturned his vehicle into a ditch. Fortunately, he was not hurt, but the vehicle had to be overhauled. And this is costly.

When the matter was looked into, it became clear that the soldier had not studied in the automotive school, and that his parents bought him his driver's license.

They bought the rights. . . They sent him off to the army unprepared morally and physically. . . They concealed this from everyone and every kind of commission—this is really a delayed action mine. This is what the concern of the communists of the regiment is, and it requires every kind of support and, what is most important, understanding.

"To tell the truth, all of the lads are difficult," said Mashchitskiy, "and without any quotes around the word. Because you have to apply a lot of effort to bring up a real person. You cannot buy this with money. But it seems that there is nobody to ask about the difficult conditions of education, difficult parents, difficult public persons and difficult pedagogues. But then, as a regimental commander, I am responsible to society, as they say, for all matters—for the difficult soldiers and for the difficult parents—and there is nothing that can be done about it. And I am ready to be responsible. But then I will also ask you to give me appropriate rights. And the answer I get: this is not, as they say, a concern of this department. Everyone shuts himself off, and we are not talking here about an intensification of social consciousness. If we could just attain what is elementary. . ."

"Perhaps it is not quite like this, Vladimir Pavlovich. They should understand at the ministerial level that the problem far exceeds the bounds of departmental pride.

"It is entirely possible that today this is recognized more clearly than previously. By the way, read the answer to my inquiry. . ."

"Dear Vladimir Pavlovich! The management of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education and officials of the staff responsible for the condition of Russian-language instruction and physical training, for NVP [basic military training] and for patriotic military education were acquainted with your letter and fully share your alarm and profound concern over the state of affairs relating to the preparation of students, especially in national schools, for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

"The facts cited in your letter, unfortunately, do take place and are confirmed by our continuous checks on the spot.

"The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education and the organs of national education have always paid attention to questions associated with the preparation of students for service in the army, in particular to questions of Russian language, physical training, NVP, and improvement in the forms and methods of patriotic military training. With respect to the publication of the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the betterment of preparation of pre-induction age and

draft age young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces, the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education has examined the treatment of this problem thoroughly.

"In particular, organizational conclusions have been made by a number of employees who deal with these problems. An objective evaluation of the state of affairs has been given at meetings of the board of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education, and oblast, rayon and city soviets, specific measures have been outlined and compressed periods have been set for the creation and perfection of a material training base for the Russian language, physical training and NVP, and for the training and retraining of cadres of teachers in the indicated subjects, as well as improvement of the training process.

"The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education jointly with the Turkestan Military District, republic military commissariats, Uzbek SSR sports committees, the Central Committee of Uzbek SSR DOSAAF, the Uzbek Ministry of Health and other interested organizations have conducted republic aktivs, seminar meetings, conferences and other measures.

"The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education and organs of national education see unresolved questions in the current problem and available capabilities and reserves, and under the leadership of the party and soviet organs, jointly with all interested organizations, will continuously employ the most resolute, effective and urgent measures, which will in a short time radically improve the preparation of young students for service in the the USSR Armed Forces and for the defense of the motherland.

"First Deputy of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education A. Frolov."

The reply of the ministry is reassuring to a degree. However, in our view, the deputy inquiry of the regimental commander sets the problem of the preparation of young people for the performance of military duty in a context that is somewhat broader. There has to be concern not only at the level of the Ministry of Education, professional education, public health and military commissariats—but at all stages, starting with the family.

... I recently made a phone call to the unit to find out if there was anything new with the young people of the autumn callup. The headquarters reported: so far everything was normal, with difficulty, but they were getting into the swing of service life. But there is a new regimental commander—Lt Col Mashchitskiy was promoted and transferred. True, his deputy concerns remain as before.

13052

Col Gen Kochetov Promoted

18010374 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed 50-word "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On Awarding to Colonel General Kochetov, K.A. the Military Rank of General of the Army".]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves: to award to Colonel-General Kochetov, Konstantin Alekseyevich the military rank of General of the Army.

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
A. Gromyko.

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
T. Menteshashvili.

Moscow, the Kremlin. 29 April 1988.

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Gen Army Lushev Visit to PDRK

18010363 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed 50-word Article entitled: Departure to PDRK]

USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army P.G. Lushev departed on the 19th of April for a working visit in Pyongyang at the invitation of the Minister of the People's armed forces of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

UD/335

Book Review on Soviet Armed Forces Since WWII

18010242 [Editorial report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 April 1988 on page 2 carries a 1000 word review entitled "On Guard Over Peace and Security" by General of the Army D. Sukhorukov of a book by A. Babakov entitled "The Armed Forces of the USSR Since the War (1945-1986)". Sukhorukov states: "Analyzing the building of the Soviet Armed Forces over the course of the forty plus years of post-war development, the author sets forth and develops a basis for the periodization of their history into four stages. . . The years 1945 to 1953—the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces and development on the basis of conventional combat equipment; the years 1954 to 1961—radical restructuring of the Soviet Armed Forces—under the influence of the military-technical revolution; the years 1962 to 1972—the building up of the Soviet Armed Forces in the interests of achieving military-strategic balance with the world; the years 1973 to 1986—the

strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces in the circumstances of the preservation and consolidation of military parity. He rightly expresses the opinion that from the middle of the 80's, a new stage begins, arising from the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and the necessity for the consolidation of peace and stability in the world.

"Basing his claims on unimpeachable historical facts the author demonstrates the constant readiness and capacity of the Soviet Union to take radical measures in the area of arms control and arms reduction on the basis of reciprocity, to head off the threat of war. Such is the new state of affairs in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces in the nuclear-space age. . . ."

[Text omitted]

"The interdependence of the contemporary world, the interlocking of historical fates of all nations and peoples in the circumstances of the nuclear age, the worry about the future of civilization before the face of the growing threat of world war all authoritatively call for the formation of a new military-political thinking, for new approaches to the building of the Soviet Armed Forces. These are expressed in the materials and documents of the 27th CPSU Congress, and the consequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. They are strengthened by the practical activities of the Soviet Government in the international arena. . . ."

[Text omitted]

"The value of the book lies in the fact that in it, along with a historical analysis, the important questions of theory in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces are set forth. The dependence of the defensive measures on the level of economic and social-political development of Soviet society and on the ideological maturity of the people is emphasized. . . . The author analyzes such component aspects as the unity of the army and the people, socialist internationalism, equipment procurement on the basis of sufficiency, the harmony of the development of the branches and services, the central position of command and control and high military discipline, and unflagging readiness to repel the aggressor."

Mentioning the book's shortcomings, the general states: "The fundamental theses of the book, naturally, are in need of further development with a consideration of those demands which are coming before military-historical science in the conditions of restructuring. It is preferable to further discuss the shortcomings and paths to solving problems in the areas of the strengthening of discipline, increasing vigilance, and military readiness. There is a need for a fundamental analysis of the aims, essence, contents, and peculiarities of restructuring in the army and navy. It is important to further uncover the

peculiarities of building the Soviet Armed Forces and the influence on them of the documents of the Central Committee plenums after the 27th CPSU Congress."

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Obituary: Lt Gen P.M. Petrenko

18010375 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 88 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed 150-word article entitled: "P.M. Petrenko".]

[Excerpts]

Following a serious and prolonged illness Lieutenant-General (ret.) Petrenko, Pavel Maksimovich, has died. . . a member of the Communist Party since 1939.

P.M. Petrenko was born in 1918 in the village of Chkalovo in Nikopolskiy rayon, Dnepropetrovsk oblast. In 1938 he began his service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. He participated actively in combat operations during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

... was a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Southern Group of Forces—deputy Commander of the missile and artillery troops of the Ground Forces for political affairs.

...

Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, M.D. Popkov, S.I. Postnikov, D.A. Grinkevich, V.M. Mikhalkin, V.A. Merimskiy, A.A. Galkin, M.Ye. Penkin, V.P. Kuznetsov, P.I. Bazhenov, Yu.T. Chesnokov, Ye.M. Komarov, I.G. Kuznetsov, Yu.I. Shumilikhin, V.G. Kryukov, M.V. Yakushin, L.S. Sapkov, M.D. Sidorov, V.A. Grishantsov, I.N. Anashkin.

UD/335

Obituary: Lt Gen I.T. Yakimenko

18010349 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Mar 88 p 3

[Unattributed 100-word article]

[Excerpts] An active participant of the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant General (ret) Ivan Tikhonovich Yakimenko has died unexpectedly.

...He was a member of the Communist Party since 1941.

I.T. Yakimenko was born on 31 March 1918. ...He was one of the organizers of research and development in the area of electronics. ...

V.M. Shabanov, V.G. Kolesnikov, S.F. Kolosov, A.G. Funtikov, S.V. Ilyushin, E.Ye. Ivanov, Yu.A. Kozlov, M.G. Yazov, A.I. Shuklin, V.K. Denisov, V.A. Pavlov, A.P. Gribochev, V.A. Fomin.

UD/335

Excess Rigidity Foils Development of Air Combat Training

18010330 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Mar 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Korotovskiy, Military Pilot First Class, and Capt S. Frolov: "A Hobbled Initiative"]

[Text] The tactical training of the pilot, as is known, is the core of the combat effectiveness of aviation subunits. Everyone seemingly understands this verbally. At meetings and conferences I hear far and wide: a pilot should be taught that which he will require in war. But, the sad thing is that we talk a lot, but are doing far from everything possible to accomplish this. As a result, there are frequent instances when indulgences and simplifications are permitted, and when flights are carried out under easy conditions, where one cannot even talk about searching and creativity.

We have heard much about the sad lessons about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. From books we know how these lessons were taken into account later, how the tactics of aviation units and large units were changed, and how the tactical training of pilots and navigators was improved. We know that new tactical techniques were often worked out by the pilots themselves, displaying initiative and sharp-wittedness, and seeking out the most effective methods of conducting aerial battles, and making bombing and strafing strikes against ground and sea targets. We know, but we are unable to rid ourselves of commonplace methods and stereotypes. Seemingly we are not sitting on our hands, day and night the airfields know no silence. But take a close look; little benefit is being derived. You will see that here they played safe, there they made things easy, and over there they overlooked things. And as a result, we do not have the end result that we should.

Here is a characteristic example. According to the training program, the aviators of the subunit in which Capt Yu. Krylov is a military pilot second class were to work out piloting techniques and techniques for combat operations over the sea. The crews flew to another airfield. Taking into account that all of the aerial warriors were trained to conduct combat operations at maximally low altitude over land, the commanders began to plan flights over sea at that same altitude. But, Col Yu. Kolesnikov, who visited the subunit from higher headquarters, prohibited the aviators from working out this task, making reference to a provision of the guidance document.

On the one hand, Col Yu. Kolesnikov was correct. According to the documents regulating flight work, flights over sea are permitted only at low altitude. But, you see there is also no prohibition to flying under conditions of maximally low altitudes. So why not give the pilots an opportunity to test themselves in a more complex environment? All the more so, in that such conditions in combat will not be a rarity.

The officers in the subunit attempted to prove to Col Kolesnikov the need for flying at altitudes that would ensure the greatest probability of overcoming "enemy" PVO [air defense]. But, the headquarters representative did not listen to their opinion. He said that he was not authorized to give such permission. But, he could have referred the matter to senior commanders. However, Col Kolesnikov did not do this, and as a result the flight crews had to accomplish their tasks at altitudes unfavorable for overcoming air defense. And if we speak more plainly, they did not succeed in creating the necessary situations for improving their skills of combat employment. As a result, aviation fuel was burned and equipment resources used, and the necessary effect was not achieved. Moral harm was also inflicted upon those who attempted to display initiative, based on the real skill of the pilots.

Needless to say, we are not placing in doubt the documents that regulate flying work. They are, as we understand clearly, the result of many years of experience. Nevertheless, it seems to us that some of their provisions are out of date and based on training pilots under simplified conditions, and do not reflect today's demands.

Of course, it is impermissible to risk human life thoughtlessly. But, one can also not get by without intelligent, measured risk in military training work. There is no way one can get by in it without initiative, creativity and searching. Where can these qualities needed by military people be developed like on daily flights?

However, daily flights are literally standardized from takeoff to landing by documents. And therefore the slightest deviation or initiative on the part of one pilot or another is usually evaluated as nothing other than aerial hooliganism. In our view this is incorrect. Take just the takeoff. During the war years, aircraft took off from airfields located a short distance from the front line, for example, with a short climb, and only achieving a certain distance from the airfield did they ascend to the given altitude. This was done for the objective of camouflaging the airfield and for the safety of the flight. Now you will see nothing of the sort. Takeoffs are implemented strictly according to a single method. That is, they are standardized. In a combat situation such a stereotyped approach could cost dearly.

This fact also raises a question. Numerous documents arrive in the units on flight safety, but almost nothing on the development of new tactical techniques. Why? Is this a secondary matter? Or do the senior officials assume that seeking new tactical solutions should come exclusively from below? It is doubtful that such a path is most advisable. It is, you see, necessary to analyze and generalize valuable experience, and to seek it through joint efforts. But, such coordination is also lacking.

Take the same regiment about which we have been speaking. Last year alone the pilots developed approximately 20 tactical innovations. Some techniques were borrowed in subunits equipped with other types of aircraft, and perfected taking into consideration their equipment, and others were born as a result of the creativity of the flying personnel. How, for example, can we not recall squadron commander Lt Col M. Osin, who proposed an interesting variant for conducting aerial reconnaissance as part of a group searching for ground based cruise missiles in a given area. The use of this variant had the best effect on the fulfillment of military training tasks.

Other innovations could also be named, the introduction of which expanded the tactical arsenal of the unit flying personnel. However, pilots of other regiments, unfortunately, do not know about them.

There are numerous reasons for this. It would hardly be correct to assert that here the senior commanders are the obstacle. The main reason for the slowing, in my view, is the fact that the documents regulating flying work do not provide for creative solutions. Neither time, nor the necessary resources and ammunition are allotted to their development.

This year, it is true, they attempted to "open" a window for this. But the attempts got no further. What happens is that techniques may be proposed, but as before there is no fuel and munition to test them out.

The flight personnel training plan is law. Freedom here is impermissible. Nevertheless, the plan is not dogma. In life it sometimes happens that some points of the plan, for one reason or another, are not entirely fulfilled. For example, this happened last training year in this regiment in accomplishing flights in a terrain-following mode in manual regime. Here, it would seem, it also became possible to use the fuel and resources saved for developing new tactical techniques. However, the documents do not permit this.

How can a new tactical technique be tested just the same? Here and there we test them through various devices, but much remains on paper. It should, apparently, be concluded from this that we not only do not take a responsible attitude toward proposals by thoughtful, talented people, but cut the wings of their initiative, and kill their interest in creativity.

Here is an example. Last year the VVS [Air Forces] main staff announced a competition for developing the best tactical technique for destroying small, mobile targets. Capt Yu. Krylov was involved in this. Soon he proposed

an original development. It was approved in the regiment. As far as we know, it also received a high mark at the higher headquarters. Unfortunately, everything ended with this. Up to now, nothing is known about the fate of Capt Krylov's proposal in the unit, although enough time has passed to test the novelty, and inform the people whether or not the innovation warrants attention.

Last year, to improve flying skill and raise combat readiness, the regiment decided to make each crew commander give a paper to his fellows on a particular topic associated with military training of flight personnel. The first papers, prepared by Lt Col M. Osin and others, instilled optimism. The seminars were lively and interesting. Each pilot could express his opinion, and make recommendations and suggestions.

Here the party organization could have become involved in the work, to generalize the experience of the best and tell about those whose papers were most thorough. However, neither Maj V. Lopatin, party committee secretary, nor the other party activists took an interest in this initiative. As a result, the spark of creativity began to die down, and then went out altogether.

Naturally, the regimental command is also at fault for what happened. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the party activists are doing far from everything that depends on them to develop people's initiative and creativity, although this is most of all their concern and their job. Unfortunately, Maj V. Lopatin is rarely seen at flights. He sits in his office and writes papers. Therefore, he doesn't even know the true level of training of the flight crews. And without knowing this, how can he work with people? How can he mobilize them to achieve new heights in military competition, and to develop initiative and creativity?

We say that a pilot is a heroic profession. But, under modern conditions, heroism alone is not enough to achieve victory. It is also necessary to have thorough knowledge of the equipment and weapons, and to be able to use them skillfully in a real combat environment, be prepared to display keenness and stratagem, and employ that tactical technique that would make it possible to place the enemy in a difficult position, and bend him to your will.

Under hothouse conditions this will not be achieved, since they do not allow such a situation to be created in which the pilot would have the opportunity to work, not only intensely and responsibly, but also creatively, and with a sense of his right to take a justified risk where otherwise growth of his skill and combat readiness are not possible.

9069

Question on Control Over INF Missiles

18010376 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed 100-word article entitled: "On the Question of Control over M/SRBMs".]

[Text] The newspaper NEW YORK TIMES reported that deep disagreements have arisen between the Soviet and American sides on the questions of control, related to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of medium and short range missiles. Commenting on this report the deputy chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V.P. Perfilev said to a TASS correspondent:

In our view there is no basis for these assertions. The INF Treaty is intended to establish a strict system of controls over the fulfillment of the obligations accepted

by the sides, and we begin with the fact that all of the provisions of the treaty, including those concerned with control will be fully and completely observed by both sides upon its entry into force.

With regard to specific procedural questions, which are naturally arising both on the Soviet side and on the American side in preparation for the realization of the treaty, they will be discussed and agreed upon in a businesslike, constructive plan via diplomatic channels and in the course of the consultation of experts.

Any attempt to use this necessary and useful work as a pretext for the complication of the circumstances surrounding the INF Treaty can only be viewed as specious and detrimental.

UD/335

Alert Drill Reveals Shortcomings in Perm's CD Readiness

18010336 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Apr 88 p 6

[Article by A. Pashkov: "Under the Wail of Sirens—What the Air Raid Warning Declared by Misunderstanding in Perm Showed"]

[Text] In the quiet pre-dawn hour in Perm, city of a million people, these terrible words resounded over the local radio: "Citizens! Air raid warning! Citizens! Air raid warning! And the wail of sirens disrupted the sleepy calm.

"Girls! Get up! Something has happened," Olga Monakhova awakened her friends.

Having awakened immediately, the classmates listened: Outside the window a siren wailed hollowly. In the houses opposite lights shined alarmingly. Here and there people came out of doorways, looking at the sky. The girls dressed feverishly and rushed into the corridor. The entire floor of the dormitory of the Perm Cultural Education School was agitated. The girls, hardly older than school children, were confused, not knowing how to act. They rushed to stand watch, and began to phone "02." Busy. Anzhelika Lukyanchikova remembered that they were once told: If something happens, flee into the woods. They wanted to do so, but were embarrassed that nobody from the neighboring houses was fleeing anywhere. Then they set out to school.

V. Gilin, engineer at the Perm Machinebuilding Factory imeni V. I. Lenin, upon hearing the alarm quickly collected documents and a few things, took his children and went down to the courtyard. There was a shelter there. However, a lock hung on its door and the chart said: the key is with the duty mechanic. There was a number to telephone. Viktor Fedorovich called the number and was told: no instructions had been received. And, therefore, they did not have the authority to open the shelter.

Nurse L. Mazunin, on duty at the time at the city hospital, went down to the basement upon hearing the signal. The patients, in her words, were sleeping at the time, since the radio in the wards was turned off.

"Yes, and thank God," added Chief Doctor A. Kats. "Otherwise the consequences for the seriously ill, those with infarctions, would have been unpredictable."

So, what happened in the city? What disturbed hundreds of thousands of people? Stories about confused and frightened people that morning in Perm can be told endlessly.

The oblast center was planning to test the state of civil defense. Two days before its start, Ye. Shmelev, oblast civil defense chief of staff, decided to check the readiness

of the leaders of his services. This, naturally, was kept secret, and for greater insurance Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich phoned the duty desk not from the headquarters, but from his apartment. These small "novel elements" in the procedure for planned tests that had been followed for years, undoubtedly played their fatal role.

Retired Lt Col A. Oblitsov, who was on duty at the desk (and who had been standing duty shifts for many years), lost his head from the very start. He fussed about, and began to press various buttons one after another. Either the elderly man's nerves did not hold up, or his mind went blank. Now who can say? But, first he woke up all the oblast leaders, and then turned on the "air raid warning" alarm. When the infuriated Shmelev ordered him to turn it off, the lieutenant colonel broke off the signal, but... at the same time turned on the siren.

The incident was, of course, unprecedented. The Perm Oblast CPSU Buro considered it impossible to use Col Shmelev any longer in the position of oblast civil defense chief of staff. However, neither at the buro itself, nor later, was it ever discussed seriously what this false alarm so clearly revealed.

"Understand, I was even glad about this signal. I thought, finally they will concern themselves seriously about civil defense. Chernobyl must teach us something!" N. Vysotskiy, safety equipment and civil defense engineer at the Perm Opera and Ballet Theater told me. "But, alas, having punished the 'extremist,' they did not wish to state honestly that the population simply lost its head. And this is in no way a secret! The whole city is talking about it today."

I talked with dozens of people who that ill-fated morning feverishly tried to remember how to act in the situation. Some fled somewhere; others went back to sleep, having first turned off the radio; still others learned about everything only when they got to work. Their receiver was not turned on, and they had not heard the sirens. The girls from the cultural education school to this day do not know how they should act, and the mechanic who refused to open the shelter is certain even today that he acted correctly.

I visited a planned civil defense measure at the city hospital where nurse L. Mazunin had then been on duty. The medical personnel stood in line decorously, and briskly (but with some hesitation) answered the inspector's questions. The latter was satisfied. But I, frankly, became bothered. After all, many on that morning, in a "real situation," acted quite to the contrary! So, what is such theory worth, and why all the multiplicity of papers: Who is to do what, and how?

I was at the Kommunar Production Association. There an inspection was also held. The factory workers were all agitated by the same thing—the lack of shelters at their place of residence, and inability to act in a practical way according to the appropriate signals. The discussion was

tempestuous. The commission listened attentively to the workers, and on the certificate that recorded the results of the comprehensive inspection wrote: "All the GO [civil defense] sections at the facility are evaluated positively."

It turns out that it is as though the alarm never even happened. Nobody was interested in how the workers on the night shift acted, or why, against all regulations, the director rushed in a taxi under the wail of the siren to his home courtyard. And he, according to the operable statute is in charge of civil defense and is obligated to teach others! Though enterprise managers do not especially trouble themselves with these duties. By the way, this situation became worse after the shift to self-financing—the lengths of service of civil defense workers are reduced or combined.

"It is, however, not a matter of the number of drills," Engineer M. Gazizov from Kommunar told me. "I have taken part a number of times in civil defense exercises, and long ago became convinced how ineffective the existing training is. Astute and intelligent propaganda by television, radio, and in the newspapers is needed. Practical lessons, and not verbose lectures are needed."

The lessons are not being learned. That is what is troubling. Situations multiply, and the public consciousness is in no way gaining a firm understanding that we live today in a complex world, literally overflowing with various dangers—radiation, dangerous technologies, chemical compounds, gases... Civil defense today is most of all protection against accidents, carelessness, and criminal negligence. Chernobyl, and the accident on the railroad in Yaroslavl, indicate how important it is to be prepared for everything. Not to live in permanent fear, but to know how to act if something happens.

In the new rayons people did not know where to go to hide. There are no basements here, and the existing shelters in the city have been turned into warehouses, in violation of specially stipulated norms, and some are even flooded with water. And mosquitos procreate and

feed there. When I asked V. Parfenov, chairman of the Perm Gorispolkom, who by virtue of his position is responsible for civil defense of the city, what conclusions have been drawn from the accident, he snapped out with annoyance:

"All you newspaper types seek out hot facts! In the whole history of Perm this is the first, and I hope the last incident. What is there to discuss?"

A conversation took place in my presence between V. Kindeyev, chairman of the oblast civil defense staff, and a worker on the Dzershinskiy Rayon staff:

"Aleksandr Afanasyevich, how many garages do you have in the rayon? Let us tell the correspondent who is coming to talk to us that five people can be sheltered in each garage."

"You will not deceive the correspondent; he will learn the truth just the same."

"And who will tell him?"

"He is sitting next to me and hearing everything."

Yes, in Perm they still want to cloud everything, and reduce it all to a curiosity, an anecdote. But is it worthwhile to hide one's head in the sand like an ostrich? The disarray can be seen from afar just the same.

I studied attentively the results of the planned inspection. Points and paragraphs were written on the paper with particular scrupulousness. The commission inspected the work of Perm Oblast civil defense precisely in accordance with them. The verdict was unanimous: Everything here is at an excellent level. Everything "corresponds."

And if everything is not so in life? Does that mean that it is all the worse for life itself?

9069

Kamenev Mentioned in Call for More Historical Glasnost

18010232 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 February 88 p2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Babin; "Kamenev Mentioned in Call for More Historical Glasnost"]

[Text] Somehow, at a meeting with youths, I mentioned Sergei Sergeyevich Kamenev—one of the first commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Soviets. In the hall they began to whisper, and I recognized confusion on the faces of the young people. The names Vatsetis, Pyatakov, Rudzutak, and Yegorov also meant very little to them. They had heard only a little bit about Chernyakovskiy and Vatutin, Vavilov and Yangel, Svetlov and Rubtsov. And among those in the hall were military academy and senior level students. . .

You can believe me that I was pained for the young people and uncomfortable myself. For it is we, the older generations, who are guilty for the fact that they have grown up with such poor historical "memories."

We all know what the Great Patriotic War means for our people, how important are its experiences not only in a military but also in a moral sense. We all understand, but here is a fact: in high school only 8 hours are devoted to study of World War II. The word "study" has become one of the most widely used in our everyday life: study openness, democracy, and truth. And study history, as V.I. Lenin bequeathed to us. An orientation to the past and serious historical education, it was noted at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are vitally necessary for today's work, for solving the problems of restructuring. Deep historical thinking helps to relate the past with the present, to more fully perceive the insoluble link between eras, to more deeply sense the historical perspective.

History is the life-giving source of genuine patriotism and love for the motherland.

Examination of U.S. Binary Weapons, Delivery Vehicles

18010310a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by M. Platunov, engineer, under the rubric "Military Technical Review": "Creators of 'Binary Death'"]

[Text] The production line in American enterprises that produces "binary death" is gathering steam. Apropos of this, THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper put it this way: "The start of production of binary munitions in a military plant in Pine Bluff in the south of Arkansas is viewed by Pentagon officials as an event that has a symbolic meaning. . . It has put an end to the 14-year fight of the army to overcome opposition in the country and to win the support of Congress with respect to appropriations for the production of more than 1 million binary artillery projectiles, each of which is capable of killing hundreds of people in 2 to 5 minutes. . ."

The 155-mm artillery projectile also belongs to the new generation of chemical munitions that are called binary. The word "binary" means that a munition consists of two parts or components that are stored separately. When separated they have little toxicity, but when mixed they react and form a toxic agent.

According to information from the journal JANE'S DEFENSE REVIEW, the binary 155-mm projectile, designated M687, has the components difluorene, which is placed in the nose of the projectile, and isopropanol. The capsule with this substance is stored separately and is placed in the bottom part of the projectile in the process of its immediate preparation for firing. During firing, the "partition" that separates the components collapses. At the time of projectile flight to the target, the interaction that forms the nerve paralysis toxic agent—sarin—is completed. The spinning of the projectile on a trajectory at a speed of up to 25 revolutions per second promotes the complete flow of the components. The projectile blast is produced in the area of enemy manpower dispositions.

U.S. ground forces and marines have in their weapons inventory several thousand 155-mm self-propelled and towed guns (also including the M109A2 howitzer) capable of firing binary projectiles for a distance of up to 20 km. It is also planned subsequently to start production of a projectile with the very same makeup for the 203.2-mm howitzer. Besides artillery munitions, the U.S. is also creating other types of binary munitions. Thus, the binary warhead XM-135 is planned for the 227-mm salvo fire MLRS rocket system. This system, as is known, has been in the weapons inventory of the U.S. Army starting in the 1980s. The troops have already received about 300 combat vehicles that have a range of fire of 32 km with a rocket projectile with a warhead weighing 159 kg, and with a lighter one (107 kg), to a

range up to 40 km. With one salvo, this 12-shot launcher load, columnists observe, can in 50 seconds destroy a target located in an area with dimensions of 400 by 1,000 meters.

According to foreign press data, the XM-135 warhead should be ready for series production in the 1991 fiscal year. But the Pentagon plans to organize the output of the "Bigeye" binary chemical aviation bomb before this. It is filled with components that form the toxic agent of the VX type which, like sarin, has a nerve paralysis effect, but which is even more fatal.

The "Bigeye" aviation bomb is one of three types of new generation chemical weapons which, according to a recent statement by President R. Reagan, has "a vitally important significance for U.S. national security." This assertion not only contradicts recent events, but it also shows the true attitude of the American administration toward chemical disarmament.

The production of "binary death" promises someone large profits. Ninety million dollars is appropriated for this purpose, and the newest chemical weapon should begin to appear no later than 1990.

The U.S. Air Force intends to arm tactical fighters and ground attack aircraft with the "Bigeye" bomb, including squadrons of "F-4," "F-16," and "F-111" aircraft deployed in western Europe. The Navy plans to place the "Bigeye" bomb on aircraft carriers and to employ it with the help of carrier aircraft. Binary warheads can also be carried by cruise missiles of the "Harpoon" type and by some other missiles of the "air-to-ground" class.

According to a statement of American specialists, "the important advantage that binary munitions have over conventional chemical weapons is their safety in the production process and during transportation and operational employment."

Covering themselves with references to a chemical threat, which supposedly comes from the Soviet Union, U.S. ruling circles are speeding up the implementation of the "chemical rearmament" program. A manifestation of this, in particular, is the buildup in annual production capacity of up to 700,000 binary artillery projectiles and aviation bombs, and the intention of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase the number of chemical munitions at its disposal, including binary munitions, from 3 to 5 million units.

In analyzing the state of affairs with respect to binary munitions, many foreign observers note that the binary program is the reason why the U.S. recently began to hold up ongoing negotiations in Geneva on a ban on chemical weapons, and that these actions are nothing more than an attempt to torpedo the process of chemical disarmament.

13052

Review of Western Hydroacoustic Mine Hunting Systems

18010310b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Kolpakov under rubric "Military Technical Review": "Hydroacoustic Mine Detection Stations"]

[Text] As formerly, they are considered to be an effective and promising means of underwater mine detection. Hydroacoustic stations [sonar] are placed on minesweeper-mine hunters and are a part of the hydroacoustic systems of submarines and surface ships.

The advantage of the stations that have appeared in recent years in the U.S. Navy and in NATO country navies in comparison with much earlier modifications, foreign specialists note, is the short pulse duration and the high frequency of tracking, which provides a good angular resolution capability. However, observers mention that these are also not without shortcomings, because a search is frequently accompanied by false alarms. This is explained by the fact that emitted signals are reflected from uneven and dissimilar areas of the ocean floor, and from sunken objects, and even from large fish. The use of protective coverings on mines and other measures for reducing acoustic detectability significantly decreases the effectiveness of the combat employment of hydroacoustic stations.

Stations that are in the armaments inventory of the U.S. Navy and NATO navies can be divided into two basic groups. To the first belong stations mounted under a ship's keel. Their receiver-emitter devices are installed in special domes which are extended with the help of lifting and lowering apparatuses under the bottom of the ship. Towed hydroacoustic mine detection stations belong to the second group. Their distinguishing characteristic is that they can be placed at a required depth, and to the extent necessary, they can be brought closer to the bottom or moved away from it. Foreign specialists say that the disadvantage of towed stations is that they do not detect a mine in front of the minesweeper, but behind its stern.

According to the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, minesweeper-mine hunters of the French Navy are equipped with the TSM 2022 station. It is

capable of detecting bottom mines to a depth of up to 120 meters at a ship speed of up to 10 knots. Moreover, mine location is pinpointed with an error of not more than 1 meter.

The journal SEKAI-NO KANSEN describes the English hydroacoustic mine detection station 193M, which ensures detection of bottom objects with a diameter over 0.46 meters and a length of 1.53 meters at a distance of 550 meters from the minesweeper. The 193M is to be replaced by the 2093 station with a towed antenna for the new English minesweeper-mine hunter of the "Sundown" type. The range of this station is two times greater than that of the 193M, and the maximum search speed is 12 knots.

As foreign specialists note, the American station AN/SQQ-32, intended for the armaments of the minesweeper-hunter of the "Avenger" type, has highly modern means of forming hydroacoustic beams and automated systems for processing hydroacoustic information. This makes it possible to isolate signals from mines against a background of reverberations and other interferences and to automatically reject signals from objects that are not mines.

The command of the U.S. Navy and of the NATO country navies, as the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW reports, is paying a lot of attention to the improvement of existing hydroacoustic mine detection stations and to the creation of new ones. Work is being conducted in the direction of increasing the trustworthiness and reliability of classification and detection of mine-like objects, including at high speeds (10-15, and also possibly 20 knots), and even the probability of detection of mines of various types. Moreover, an increase in search speed is considered to be an effective means of decreasing the total number of necessary antimine forces.

A lot of attention is also being given abroad to the development of modern means of automatic identification of targets, increasing the clarity of scope reflections at the instant of contact, reducing magnetic field levels and increasing station blast resistance and repairability. Tactical and operational requirements are being worked up for prospective lateral scanning hydroacoustic stations.

13052

One-sided Press Coverage of Afghan War Criticized

[Text] 18010248 [Editorial report] Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 20, 14-20 May 1988 carries on page 3 a 900 word review of letters to the editor on the Afghan war by A. Gorbacheva entitled "They honorably fulfilled their duty. . ." Among the letters which she considers is one written by a former "internationalist-soldier" on the subject of honorary awards for soldiers who have served in Afghanistan. Gorbacheva states that the author of the letter "emphasizes that not all units should be awarded, but only those which earned it." She then quotes the author: "Among those who served in

Afghanistan, were also some who besmirched the honor of the internationalist-soldier. We cannot allow those who have not seen action to enjoy the same privileges as those who participated in battle, who under fire from dushman ambushes travelled the roads of Afghanistan transporting essential goods. They did not, for example, award everyone with "for the development of the virgin lands" medals. The opinion has formed that everyone who was in Afghanistan is a hero, but this is not so! Among us there were also scoundrels; it is a shame that our press is silent about them, that it does not speak the truth."

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